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This thesis illuminates the nature of the United States
security commitment to the Republic of Korea by analyzing
its origin. It is concluded that the commitment is a
function of the American approach to foreign policy, and
especially US-Soviet relations, more than of any
intrinsically vital US interests in Korea. Korea policy
from 1945 to 1953 is analyzed in terms of a debate between
proponents of differing approaches to commitment. The
seeming inconsistency between the 1949 troop withdrawal and
the US intervention in 1950 Is seen as the result of a shift
in overall foreign policy rather than a reassessment of
Korea's geostrateglc importance to the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States occupied the southern portion of the
Korean peninsula at the end of the Second World War. Except
for a short period, from the completion of withdrawal in the
summer of 1949 to the US intervention in the Korean War in
the summer of 1950, US forces have been there ever since.
The United States has a significant and long-standing
commitment to the Republic of Korea. Yet this commitment
has been repeatedly called into question. US forces were
withdrawn from Korea in 1949 because the military concluded
that Korea was not of sufficient strategic significance to
Justify the continued presence of American troops. They
were reintroduced to counter the North Korean Invasion, and
maintained at a consistent level while the South Korean
military was built up. But, as early as 1963, the
desirability of maintaining troops in the Republic of Korea
(ROK) was once again questioned. 1 President Nixon withdrew
the 7th Infantry Division in 1971, and in 1977 President
Carter announced the withdrawal of the 2d Infantry Division,
the last remaining major US combat unit in Korea. Although
this last decision was ultimately reversed, it once again
called Into question the nature and strength of the US
commitment to the Republic of Korea. Why has this
commitment, maintained over so many years at such a great
cost to the United States both In treasure and In lives,
been so often questioned in Washington, and so consistently
doubted In Seoul?
A. A THEORY OF COMMITMENT
Franklin B. Weinstein has advanced some ideas about the
nature of international commitments which go a long way
toward explaining this apparent anomaly. He observed that
there was "widespread uncertainty about the meaning of
commitments," and attributed this to differences in goals
and priorities between nations, as well as differences in
assumptions about the meaning of a commitment. These latter
differences occur because "there are fundamentally different
concepts of what a commitment is." 2
Weinstein defines two concepts of commitment:
"situational" and "nonsi tuat ional . " In the situational
concept, "commitments are inherent in the situation, their
verbalization is basically unimportant, and their
fulfillment is contingent on whether they still serve
national interests In the situation." Such commitments are
"transitory, reflecting little more than the arrangement of
International forces at a given moment." In the
nonsl tuat lonal concept, on the other hand, "the primary
impetus for a commi tment's fulfillment comes not from a
continuing reassessment of national interests but from a
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conviction that a government must keep all its commitments,"
regardless of how well they serve the national interest in a
given situation. But, in contrast to the situational
concept, which assumes an implicit commitment based on
national interest even in the absence of a formal
commitment, the verbalization of commitment is critical
under the nonsi tuat ional concept, since the salient issues
are prestige and credibility on a global scale, rather than
inherent interest in a particular country or region.
Advocates of both types of commitment share a common
goal: the national interest. They differ, however, in their
understanding of what that interest is. Supporters of the
situational concept emphasize immediate, specific
geopolitical Interests, while those of the nonsi tuat ional
concept argue that principles and obligations represent a
more fundamental, long-range interest.
While the situational commitment has been dominant in
history, the nonsi tuat ional variant has emerged as a
significant factor in postwar international relations. The
commitments entered into by the United States in particular
have been primarily nonsi tuat ional . Weinstein suggests that
this is because American decision makers have perceived US
commitments as unchallengeable, self-sustaining and
interdependent; the nation's honor is at stake. This
approach is reinforced by "the legalistic-moralistic strain
dominant in the rhetoric of United States foreign policy,"
as well as the "ideological and moralistic character" of
commitments in the context of the world-wide struggle
between democracy and Communism. The nature of American
politics has also contributed to the development of
nonsl tuat lonal commitments, often accompanied by overblown,
universal 1st ic rhetoric; a policy couched in terms of the
defense of freedom is easier to 'sell' to Congress.
One problem with the nonsi tuat lonal commitment, however,
is that, once established, it is very difficult to retract.
Indeed, the longer the commitment exists, the greater the
stake in it. Over the years, substantial resources are
expended; the dominant power becomes increasingly identified
with its weaker ally, investing ever growing amounts of
prestige in the relationship. The commitment, as Weinsteln
observes,
tends to acquire a substantial life of its own, taking on
significance as a symbolic demonstration of a country's
dedication to principles, security Interests, or other
considerations removed from the situation with which the
commitment is concerned.
At the extreme, a sort of reductio ad absurbum takes hold:
the commitment must be kept because it has been kept for so
long.
This Inherent characteristic of nonsl tuat lonal
commitments is reinforced by the nature of the American
system. Ideals have always played a part in US foreign
policy; particularly in the context of the ideological
struggle of the Cold War, the maintenance of commitments was
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perceived "as a sign of moral virtue, as a proof of a
government's dedication to unquestioned ideals." The
dependence of the leadership in a democracy on public
support also tends to make it difficult to end a commitment.
Since the commitment is justified in terms of enduring
principles, rather than as a response to a particular
situation, abandonment of the commitment is tantamount to an
admission of error for having made it In the first place.
This is especially true in the American system, where the
process of acquiring Congressional approval for a policy
often leads the administration to exaggerate its
nonsi tuat ional content: "The very process of defending a
commitment against its critics makes It harder for the
government to abandon or modify it." Rather than do this, a
democratic leadership will frequently "respond to evidence
of a commitment's disutility by seeking to expand it and to
devise new Justifications for it . . . ."
Finally, the fact that bureaucracies become identified
with particular commitments makes it difficult to end or
even significantly change them. In much the same manner as
the administration, the bureaucracy can acquire a stake in
the commitment as a result of its involvement In the
building and defense of that commitment. In addition,
bureaucracies become Involved over time as the implementers
of a commitment: "the involvement of large sections of the
bureaucracy in responsibilities related to the fulfillment
11
of a commitment gives them a stake in the successful
implementation of the commitment."
This phenomenon is clearly observable in the commitments
entered into by the United States in the decade following
the end of the Second World War. An effort was made to
secure world peace by the establishment of a system of
collective security, which Weinstein calls "the clearest
example of a nonsl tuat lonal comml tment . " Commitments were
undertaken "with little or no consideration of the area's
strategic importance or of the feasibility of trying to
defend it against the kind of threat which it was likely to
encounter." Local considerations were subordinated to "the
establishment of the principle that aggression is
impermissible." Once these commitments were established, it
became extremely difficult to abandon or modify them, even
long after the original rationales upon which they were
based ceased to be relevant.
B. HYPOTHESIS
The United States security commitment to the Republic of
Korea has always been, and continues to be, a nonsi tuat lonal
commitment. Indeed, the lengthy policy debate which
determined America's Korea policy in the immediate
post-World War II years centered around the question of
which framework was appropriate, with the military on the
one hand arguing that a commitment to South Korea was not
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justifiable from a situational perspective because of its
low strategic value, and the State Department arguing on the
other hand that a commitment was necessary from the
nonsi tuat ional perspective because of the importance of
events in Korea to American prestige and credibility in
other, more vital areas. Seen in this way, the seeming
reversal of policy from the withdrawal in 1949 to the
intervention in the Korean War in 1950 does not represent a
reassessment of Korea so much as a shift in approach to the
handling of foreign policy as a whole.
The Republic of Korea, on the other hand, has
consistently sought an unequivocal, situational commitment,
based on a recognition of the vital importance of the Korean
peninsula to the stability of Northeast Asia and hence the
security of the United States. This dichotomy in
perceptions of the basis of the US commitment is the
explanation of the persistent misunderstandings which have
characterized US-ROK relations. Since the US commitment is
nonsi tuat i onal , it is a function of the American view of the
world, and most especially of the struggle between the US
and the USSR and between democracy and Communism. As this
view has changed over the years, as the Cold War has ebbed
and flowed, the perceived utility of the security commitment
to the ROK has changed also. By contrast, the ROK has been
constantly confronted with a seemingly implacable enemy,
North Korea, whose determination to dominate the entire
13
peninsula seems undimished today, three and a half decades
after the Korean War.
Most recently, under the Reagan Administration,
relations between the US and the ROK have improved
tremendously. This improvement, however, has resulted
because of American acceptance of the Korean definition of
the nature of the commitment, which has in turn been
possible because of a heightened perception of the threat
represented by an expansive Soviet Union. Regardless of the
rhetoric, though, the underlying logic of the American
commitment has not changed. While it cannot be denied that
the United States has many significant Interests in the
Republic of Korea, they are no more vital, and in many ways
even less so, than they were in 1949 when US occupation
forces were withdrawn. As the world situation inevitably
evolves, the United States will once again begin to question
its security commitment to the ROK, particularly the
continued presence of ground combat forces. If this process
is not to result in even more acrimonious debates, and a
renewed feel ing of betrayal on the part of the South
Koreans, It is imperative that the true nature of the US
security commitment be understood, and that future US-ROK
relations be placed on the firm foundation of this
understanding.
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II. THE BEGINNING OF US INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA
A. THE POSTWAR CONTEXT
As the United States pursued its goal of military
victory in the Second World War, it became increasingly
clear that the postwar world would be very different from
the one which had preceeded it. In Northeast Asia, the most
fundamental change was, of course, the removal of Japan as
the dominant regional power. As Ak i ra Iriye observes, "The
anticipated defeat of Japan meant the removal from the scene
of the one nation that had provided a stable pattern of
big-power politics for several decades." 3 US Asian policy,
in this context, can be viewed as a search for a new
regional balance. In the process, US interest in the Korean
peninsula, long quiescent, inevitably revived. 4
While Korea had long been pivotal in regional affairs,
it had never been considered to be of particular importance
to the United States. American interests, as expressed in
the Open Door Notes, were mainly commercial, and centered on
China. Even when the US began to expand westward, its
interest was in the Pacific, as opposed to the Asian
mainland, and, in the Taft-Katsura agreement, it had
willingly acquiesced In Korea's status as a Japanese colony
in exchange for Japanese recognition of US interests in the
Philippines. Though decried by the Koreans as an example of
15
American perfidy, this was no more than a recognition of
Japan's status as the dominant power in the region following
its victory in the Russo-Japanese War.
5
It is understandable, then, that consideration of Korea
In the postwar context focused on its effect on the new
regional balance of power. The idea of a Korean state
itself playing a significant part, which would have implied
a situational commitment on the part of the US, was never
seriously considered. It was clear, rather, that the demise
of Japan would create a void which must be filled, among the
remaining regional powers, by either China or the Soviet
Union. The United States, now firmly albeit somewhat
reluctantly established as the dominant Pacific power, did
not envision for itself a direct role on the Asian mainland.
Soviet expansion was regarded as inevitable, but US
interests would be protected by a united and friendly
China. 6 The result, the new East Asian world order, would
be what Iriye calls "some sort of condominium ... on the
basis of the vastly extended power of the Soviet Union and
the limited involvement of the United States, with a
rehabilitated and stronger China standing in between." 7
This scheme, which called for the establishment of China as
a Great Power, was launched at the Cairo Conference in 1943,
at which It was declared that all Chinese territories seized
by Japan would be returned.® At the same conference, it was
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decided that, following the surrender of the Japanese, an
International trusteeship would be established in Korea.
America's Korea policy at this time was marked by what
is, in retrospect, an almost incredible tentat 1 veness. John
Lewis Gaddls aptly refers to Roosevelt's approach to many
postwar Issues as a "strategy of postponement," and Korea
was a prime example. 9 In one sense, this was almost
Inevitable considering Roosevelt's goals in Korea, and the
lack of a good vehicle for attaining these goals in the
absence of a strong China. The United States wanted to
preclude domination of Korea by any outside power, but did
not want to dominate Korea itself. Roosevelt was convinced,
as his distant cousin Theodore had been in 1905, that the
Koreans were Incapable of governing themselves. To avoid an
otherwise inevitable Sino-Soviet contention for Korea,
Roosevelt settled on the idea of an international
trusteeship, which he envisioned might last as long as forty
years. The details of this plan were never clearly
expressed, but that was not really important. As Stephen
Pelz observes, the concept of trusteeship was "a satlsflcing
device." 10 It provided maximum flexibility in a period of
great uncertainty.
The Korean trusteeship plan persisted through subsequent
wartime planning and became part of the Yalta system. 11 A
subtle shift occurred in US perceptions, however, as the
weakness of China became increasingly apparent. Bilateral
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relations with the Soviet Union became the key to regional
stability. 1 ^ Roosevelt clearly considered cooperation with
the Soviet Union to be a very viable option, and hoped to
coopt Stalin by giving him a stake in the postwar system--a
policy Gaddis calls "containment by integration." 13 Hardly
an idealist, Roosevelt nevertheless believed that the
Russians would cooperate because it was in their interest to
do so.
One minor result of this belief was the fact that
wartime planning for the occupation of Korea, such as it
was, did not envision any Involvement by US forces. It was
assumed that the Soviets would work with the United States
to establish the planned trusteeship, regardless of which
side's forces actually accepted surrender of Japanese forces
in Korea. 14 As late as the Postdam Conference, General
Marshall told the Russians that the US did not plan to land
forces on the Korean peninsula. 15
This approach was called into question, however, as the
Russians moved into Eastern Europe. The pattern that
clearly emerged, from the American perspective, was one of
heavy-handed Communist control wherever the Red Army went.
In response, some of now-Presi dent Truman's advisors began
to question the wisdom of allowing the Russians to occupy
all of Korea. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, observing
the evolving situation In Korea, called it "the Polish
question transplanted to the Far East," and suggested that
18
"at least a token force of American soldiers or marines be
stationed in Korea during the trusteeship." 16 W. Averel
1
Harriman, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, recommended that
"landings be made to accept surrender of the Japanese troops
at least on the Kwantung Peninsula and in Korea," to relieve
Russian pressure on China. 17 Edwin W. Pauley, Truman's
friend and Reparations Commissioner, hoping to "prevent
Russian excesses," urged that "our forces should occupy
quickly as much of the industrial areas of Korea and
Manchuria as we can." 18 The State Department, in the person
of Secretary of State Byrnes, suggested that US forces
"receive the surrender as far north as practicable." 19 It
was decided that the 38th parallel was the northernmost line
the Soviets would possibly accept, Korea was divided, and an
American occupation was established in the south. 20
Some analysts suggest that these were the first faint
stirrings of the Cold War. Bruce Cumlngs argues that the
shift in policy on Korea was the result of the growing
Influence of "the nationalists among FDR's advisors"
following Truman's succession to the presidency; James
Matray adds that these were the advisors "most dedicated to
a policy of toughness toward the Soviet Union." 21 In their
view Truman, emboldened by the successful testing of the
atomic bomb, attempted to redefine previous arrangements to
keep the Russians from attaining a position of dominance
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in East Asian affairs, discarding trusteeship in favor of a
direct role in shaping postwar Korea, a policy which Cumings
labels "premature containment." 22 It does seems clear that
the shift in Korea policy was based on Truman's application
of European precedents to Asia, and that this represented a
definite departure from Roosevelt's approach. The key
point, however, is whether or not this represented a change
in US perceptions of Korea's importance. Cumings asserts
that Korea was "increasingly defined as essential to the
security of the postwar Pacific," and Matray contends that
concern over the strategic threat to China and Japan
prompted US efforts to preclude Soviet control of the entire
Korean peninsula. 23 Pelz, however, rejects this idea, and
argues Instead that the motivation for occupation was "to
gain leverage for trusteeship negotiations;" 24 Truman was
attempting to safeguard Korean trusteeship, in light of
experiences with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, by
denying the Russians a dominant position in Korea. Gaddis
also emphasizes denial as the bottom-line US objective:
The decision to establ ish an American presence in Korea
must be viewed in the same context as the decision, taken
at the same time, to deny the Russians an occupation zone
in Japan. Both were made in the light of experiences in
Europe; both were Intended to minimize the amount of
territory in the Far East to come under Russian
control . 25
The view that the occupation of Korea was undertaken
primarily for global political as opposed to regional
strategic reasons is buttressed by the fact that, in a
20
pattern that was to be repeated over the next five years, it
was advocated by the State Department and opposed by the War
Department .26 -p^e fundamental American perception of Korea
had not changed. 27 The American goal was still to preclude
domination of Korea by any outside power. What changed was
the US perception of the basic trustworthiness of the
Russians, which had been a key assumption of the earlier
planning for initial Russian occupation of the entire
peninsula. As such, the US involvement with Korea, from the
very beginning, revolved around US-Soviet relations far more
than any intrinsic value attributed to the Korean peninsula.
B. TRUSTEESHIP
Truman initially sought to continue Roosevelt's policy
of seeking to cooperate with the Soviet Union, but the
behavior of the Russians and the counsel of Truman's
advisers led him to adopt a tougher, quid pro quo
negotiating strategy. 28 In Korea, the US goal continued to
be the creation of a trusteesh ip . 29 The initial directive
on Korean occupation, SWNCC 176/8, approved on 13 October
1945, stated that the "ultimate objective of the United
States with respect to Korea is to foster conditions which
will bring about the establishment of a free and independent
nation. "30 This policy was reviewed and confirmed by SWNCC
101/4, approved 24 October 1945; significantly, this
document also concluded that no part of Korea should be
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designated as a strategic area, which would have allowed
retention of US forces. Instead, it was deemed advisable
"to terminate military occupation as early as
practicable." 31 But the advocates of a US position in
Korea, chiefly the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the
State Department, saw Korea as a potential bargaining chip
in dealings with the Soviets concerning China and Japan, and




The Imaginary line of the 38th parallel, however, soon
began to solidify Into a very real barrier, calling into
serious question the likelihood of Russian cooperation in
the establishment of the kind of trusteeship envisioned in
Washington. As a result, Korea was one of the major issues
on the agenda when Secretary of State James Byrnes went to
Moscow in December 1945. The resulting Moscow Agreement
called for the establishment of a Joint Commission
consisting of representatives of the two occupation commands
to "assist the formation" of "a provisional Korean
democratic government." 33 This commission was duly
established, and held Its first meeting in Seoul on 20 March
1946 to consider the trusteeship issue. 34
Negotiations, however, quickly came to a standstill. In
addition to the strong opposition of the Koreans in the
south to the concept of trusteeship, it soon became apparent
that the Russians had their own idea of what constituted a
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democratic government, and were intent on "excluding all
parties from participation in Korean Political life except
the Communists." 35 The Americans, for their part, were
equally unwilling to accept an outcome favorable to the
Soviet Union. 36 The quid pro quo approach ultimately proved
a failure, since the US did not have the ability to compel
the Russians, by either sticks or carrots, to make the
sweeping concessions desired in Washington. 37
It was concluded that there was M not much hope for
future accomplishment by the Commission," so it adjourned on
6 May 1946, and "negotiations looking toward the creation of
a Provisional Korean Government came to a halt." 38 At the
same time, the first cautious steps were taken toward the
creation of a separate, pro-American government in the
south, a policy which Hodge's Political Adviser, William
Langdon, has advocated even before the Moscow Conference. 39
Exiled Korean leaders, Including Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku
,
were allowed to return, but as individuals rather than as
representatives of the Provisional Government.
Nevertheless, those groups on the political right soon
coalesced around Rhee and began to dominate Korean politics.
When plans for the election of a legislative assembly were
announced in July 1946, it was a clear that Rhee and his
followers would prevail. The election was held from 17-22
October 1946, and, not surprisingly, no non-rightist
candidates were victorious. To achieve a more
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representative balance, the Military Governor appointed an
equal number of moderates, but this step, which was never
accepted by the right, foredoomed the fledgling assembly.
In addition, the Military Government, despite statements to
the contrary, never granted the assembly any substantive
authority. As a result, the South Korean Interim
Legislative Assembly, which convened 12 December 1946 and
was formally in existence for eighteen months, accomplished
very little of any sign i f i cance . 40 Nevertheless, it was an
early indication that the United States was prepared to
create a separate state in the south.
While the concept of a trusteeship was not completely
abandoned, it was apparent that any accomodation with the
Soviet Union which would be acceptable to the United States
would not be achieved merely through negotiation. Since
both sides were concerned with the ultimate outcome rather
than the process, and since the acceptable outcomes were
diametrically opposed, no meaningful compromise was
possible. But the United States was not yet ready to accept
this. The State Department in particular still hoped to
achieve unification as called for in the Moscow Agreement.
The military in Washington was relatively indifferent, being
concerned more with the drain of resources than the ultimate
fate of Korea, but the military representatives in Korea
were staunchly ant i -Commun i st and determined to prevent a
shift to the left. In practice, this meant that nothing was
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done particularly well. Little progress was made toward the
creation of a viable Independent south Korea, since the
occupation authorities were reluctant to take steps which
might Interfere with the hoped-for unification of the
peninsula under a trusteeship. 41 But the military
government, by consistently supporting rightist elements in
Korea, simultaneously undermined any prospects of ever
achieving this goal.
C. "PATIENCE AND FIRMNESS"
The failure of the Joint Commission to arrive at a
formula for trusteeship was a reflection of the wholesale
deterioration of relations between the US and the USSR. The
United States Initially believed that Russian actions were
intended to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union, and
were able to deal with the Kremlin on that basis, but Soviet
actions in Europe, as well as developments in the
international communist movement, convinced many American
officials that the Soviets were committed to a program of
virtually unlimited expansion which ultimately threatened
the very survival of the United States. 42
The period from late February to early March 1946 was
the pivotal turning point in US-Soviet relations, marking
the end of postwar cooperation and the beginning of
confrontation. Various events and factors combined to
Induce this change. On 9 February 1946, Stalin delivered a
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speech In Moscow stressing the fundamental incompatibility
of communism and capitalism. This followed on the heels of
the first Soviet veto in the Security Council, on a
relatively minor matter clearly not vital to Soviet
interests, an ominous sign for the future viability of the
United Nations. Then, on 16 February 1946, news broke of an
espionage ring in Canada which had stolen secret data on the
atomic bomb for the Russians. These events provided ample
ammunition for Republican attacks on administration foreign
policy, which were reaching their peak i ntensi ty .43
The actions of the Soviet Union suggested that, contrary
to the fundamental assumptions of both Roosevelt's policy of
cooperation and Truman's quid pro quo approach, the Russians
were impervious to external Influences, and that their
behavior could not be ameliorated by either threats or
concessions on the part of the United States. 44 At this
crucial juncture, George Kennan sent his famous "long
telegram" from Moscow, in which he analyzed the motives
behind Soviet policy and concluded that they were domestic
in origin, related to the need of a repressive regime to
construct an external threat in order to justify its own
excesses. The effect in Washington was "nothing less than
sensational." 45 In many ways, Kennan's telegram galvanized
the changes which were underway in Washington's
perception of the Russians, providing a new "intellectual
framework" for analysis of Soviet foreign policy. 46 It was
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a nucleus around which pre-existing forces coalesced. But
it was an explanation of the Soviet problem, not a strategy
for dealing with that problem. Kennan's arguments, however,
were interpreted by those in power, who needed a concrete
strategy, and resulted in a new US policy: "patience and
firmness." Under this strategy, the US would no longer try
to hide its disagreements with its erstwhile ally, it would
cease making concessions to the Soviets, and it would
rebuild its military power and provide economic and military
assistance to strengthen allies. 47
The first signs of the new American policy of firmness
were oratorical : a speech by Byrnes on 28 February 1946, and
Truman's implicit endorsement of Winston Churchill's 5 March
1946 speech at Fulton, Missouri, in which he coined the term
"iron curtain." Washington confirmed the new policy,
however, by its handling of the Iranian crisis. When the
Soviets failed to remove their forces from Azerbaijan in
accordance with wartime agreements, the US issued a series
of Increasingly firm protests, finally carrying the issue to
the UN Security Council even after the Russians indicated a
willingness to withdraw. 48
This new policy was popular in the United States, but
ran counter to the even more popular policies of military
demobilization and the abolition of wartime taxes and
economic controls. 49 US military strength plummeted from a
high of 12 million at the end of World War II to 3 million
27
by July 1946, then fell further to only 1.6 million by the
summer of 1947.50 Ground forces shrank to only 670,000,
with only a fraction of these combat ready. 51 Defense
expenditures likewise plunged, falling from $81.6 billion in
fiscal year 1945 to $44.7 In fiscal year 1946, and only
$13.1 billion in fiscal year 1947. 52 This dissipation of
military strength at the precise time that US commitments
were being enlarged was a serious problem. It reflected,
however, the widely held belief that defense spending could
not exceed $15 billion without causing inflation. 53 ihe
collapse of the American economy would be as deleterious to
the national security as anything the Soviet Union could do;
in fact, it was believed that the Soviets might be
deliberately attempting to prompt excessive military
expenditures for precisely that purpose.
D. HOLDING THE LINE IN KOREA
The growing disparity between resources and commitments
exacerbated the natural rivalry of the military and
diplomatic bureaucracies. While there were variations
between individuals and over time, in general the State
Department concerned itself with the political/ideological
dimensions of a situation (the nonsl tuat lonal view), while
the military focused on the issue of strategic significance,
which was defined primarily in terms of military value in
the context of a global conflict with the Soviet Union (the
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situational view). This led to a fundamental disagreement
over the Importance of Korea to US security which began
within months, although it was not at first "fully or
explicitly articulated." 54 The State Department view,
however, clearly dominated US policy during the early part
of the occupation, and continued to do so even after the
apparent failure of the Joint Commission.
Nevertheless, the failure of negotiations forced the
State Department to develop an alternative approach. 55 On 6
June 1946, less than a month after the Joint Commission
adjourned, the State Department produced a very significant
paper which redefined US policy on Korea. 56
Far from advocating abandonment of Korea because of the
failure to create a trusteeship, this paper actually
expanded US interests. Korean independence was now seen as
Important from a global as well as a regional perspective.
In the region, it was seen as "a means of strengthening
political stability throughout the Far East," although
Korea's role as a stabilizing influence was explicitly as an
adjunct to China, which was still the central focus of
American policy in East Asia, since
the domination of Korea by either Japan or the Soviet
Union would further endanger Chinese control of Manchuria
and would thus lessen the prospect of the creation of a
strong and stable China, without which there can be no
permanent political stability in the Far East.
This was, however, merely an extension of the earlier US
objective of precluding a Sino-Soviet contest in Korea. It
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was in the global context that Korea assumed "added
significance" as "part of the much more vital problem of
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union."
Because of this significance, the United States clearly
could not simply abandon Korea. But, since negotiation had
proved Ineffective, what could be done to achieve
reunification under an acceptable trusteeship? The answer
was the creation of a viable southern Korea which would by
its very existence compel Soviet concessions:
the way to resolve the present Impasse in our favor would
seem to be to adopt a course of action in southern Korea
which would win such active popular support for United
States principles and practices as to force the Soviet
Union to modify Its present stand and at the same time
would make an understanding easier by developing common
ground for agreement with the Soviet Union.
In essence, It was hoped that economic progress in the south
would demonstrate to the Soviets that their policy of
obstruction was doomed to failure, and force them to meet
American demands, a clear example of patience with firmness.
As John Hilldrlng, then serving as State Department
representative to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
CSWNCC), put It, "when our position in Korea has been
strengthened . . . there will for the first time be reason
to hope that the Soviets will be ready to make concessions
and may even desire to initiate negotiations for an
agreement acceptable to the United States. "57 fo facilitate
the accomplishment of this objective, the military
occupation would be continued. This policy paper thus
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contained two of the three elements of what Kim Chull Baum
calls "a three-fold policy" for Korea: economic aid and a
prolonged occupation. 58 The third, rejection of
governmental level negotiations with the Soviets, soon
followed, but was in essence an adjunct to the policy of
strength by means of economic aid, since it was felt that a
governmental approach at that juncture would have been
interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness. 59
The idea that the successful development of the US
occupation zone would somehow compel the Soviets to accede
to American demands was not universally well received:
Langdon called it "a mistaken notion. "60 -p^e new policy
received important support, however, when Edwin Pauley, who
had earlier been one of those urging Truman to send US
forces into Korea, wrote the President a letter in which he
characterized Korea as "an ideological battleground upon
which our entire success in Asia may depend." He
recommended that the US "give greater technical assistance
to Korea in the reconstruction of her Industrial economy." 61
Responding to Pauley in July, Truman concluded that "Our
commitments for the establishment of an independent Korea
require that we stay in Korea long enough to see the job
through and that we have adequate personnel and sufficient
funds to do a good job." 62 Not incidentally, a program of
economic aid, in addition to demonstrating American resolve
to Moscow, would also show Congress, unhappy with
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developments in China, that the administration was
determined to meet America's commitments in Korea, without,
however, enlarging those commitments beyond what was felt to
be appropriate. 63
The new approach was challenged in late 1946 by civil
disorders in south Korea which highlighted the unpopularity
of the occupation. These began with a railroad workers'
strike on 22 September 1946, followed by a printers' strike
and threats of strikes in other sectors. On 30 September
violence erupted between police and the railroad strikers in
Seoul, resulting in the death of two or three persons, as
well as injuries to other strikers and to police. The next
day a youth, rumored to be a student, was killed by police
during a riot in Taegu. This touched off an attack on
police headquarters, followed by an "orgy of destruction"
directed at the police in numerous locations throughout the
southeastern provinces. It was believed that these
disruptions had been orchestrated by southern Communists,
but they clearly tapped a wellspring of discontent over the
rice shortage, high prices, the grain collection program
which was alleged to have been administered "arbitrarily,
unjustly, and corruptly" by the police, and the impending
rice collection program. 64 Order was temporarily restored,
but further violence erupted in October in the Kaesong area
at the western end of the 38th parallel, on the southwestern
outskirts of Seoul, and in the Mokpo-Naju area in
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southwestern Korea. Police and government officials were
attacked, and transportation and communication facilities
were sabotaged, with numerous fatalities and injuries, as
well as heavy damage to property. The authorities felt
compelled to employ tactical troops, including tank patrols
in Seoul, to maintain order. Reasons given for this renewed
upheaval included hatred of the police, the presence of
former Japanese collaborators in the military government,
corruption, the unpopular program for collection and
distribution of rice, inflation and high prices, the lack of
progress toward economic recovery, and delay in creation of
a Provisional Government. Attacks against police stations
continued into November, primarily in South Choi la Province;
on 4 November there was, for the first time, an "organized
attack" on US troops. 65
These upheavals, as well as the inability of the Korean
authorities to control them without considerable assistance
from US troops, highlighted the weakness of the American
position in Korea. It was feared that a South Korean
uprising, with or without North Korean involvement, would
compel the weak US occupation forces to leave lgnominlousl y
,
with disastrous consequences. Advocates of troop withdrawal
were further strengthened by an informal Russian proposal
for rapid withdrawal of all occupation forces, as well as
reports that North Korean forces were being developed for an
invasion of the south. Prompted by these developments, the
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Army began to actively advocate an early withdrawal of US
forces, urging that government- level diplomatic action
between the US and USSR be pursued to resolve the Korean
question. The Army position was enhanced by the lack of
success of the "three-fold" approach, which eroded the
influence of the State Department. 66
In an attempt to resolve these differences, a Special
Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea was established to
prepare policy recommendations, and on 25 February 1947 it
Issued a draft report. 67 The committee found that the
American position in Korea was indeed tenuous; in fact, it
noted that "present conditions are deteriorating rather than
improving," and expressed concern that the US position
"might soon weaken to a point where it may become
untenable." A governmental approach, however, was rejected
In favor of a program for economic rehabilitation in
Korea. 68
Up to that point, the Occupation, under the Government
Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program, had only
provided "limited imports of food and other essentials to
prevent disease and unrest." Intended as only an interim
measure to keep things from getting worse, it was failing
even at that; in a rather pithy observation, the committee
observed that "No loaning agency could consider south Korea
an acceptable risk." Nevertheless, the report rejected the
option of simply abandoning south Korea, and, in accord with
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the intentions expressed in Truman's earlier letter,
recommended Instead "an aggressive, positive, long-term
program. "69
In light of the altogether dismal condition of the South
Korean economy, it was evident that this would not be a
simple undertaking. The committee acknowledged this:
In order to succeed, such a program must be supported by
sufficient funds in the form of Congressional appropria-
tions to finance the substantial political, economic and
cultural measures required to bring about the economic
rehabilitation of southern Korea and to prepare
the country for early and complete independence.
It was estimated that $600 million would be required over
three years, starting with $250 million in fiscal year 1948.
This represented an increase of only $113 million over the
$137 million previously requested for Korea under the War
Department budget for occupied areas. Nevertheless, the
report admitted that "the outlook for approval of this sum
is not encouraging." 70 After further study and
coordination, the State Department arrived at a three-year
program totaling $540 million. This program was approved by
the Bureau of the Budget, but was never presented to
Congress. 71
This report represented a significant turning point in
US policy. 72 For the first time, US prestige throughout the
world was explicitly linked to its performance in Korea.
Abandonment of Korea in the face of Russian intransigence
would be seen as "a complete political defeat in a test of
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strength with the Soviet Union in the only area where we and
the Soviets stand face to face alone." The effect of such a
failure would go far beyond the physical loss of southern
Korea: H The loss of U.S. prestige and influence, and the
consequent increase in Soviet Influence and power, would
have prejudicial repercussions not only on U.S. interests in
the Far East but on the entire U.S. world position." 73
This position was further elaborated in the 31 March
report of the committee:
Korea's principal political importance to the US is
perhaps the effect of developments there on the whole
cause of Soviet-US relations. It is Important that there
be no gaps or weakening in our policy of firmness in
containing the USSR because weakness in one area is
invariably Interpreted by the Soviets as indicative of an
overall softening. A backing down or running away from
the USSR in Korea could easily result In a stiffening of
the Soviet attitude on Germany or some other area of much
greater intrinsic importance to us. On the other hand, a
firm "holding of the line" in Korea can materially
strengthen our position in our other dealings with the
USSR. 74
This reflected the growing weight which policymakers in
Washington were attaching to perceptions. Korea was
evolving into a symbol of American determination to "hold
the line" against the Soviet Union in East Asia.
Ultimately, the Interdepartmental Committee did not
resolve the conflict between the views of the Army and the
State Department. The 25 February report was a compromise
document, with wording supportive of both positions; as Kim
observes, "Disagreements about withdrawal were side-stepped
with balanced or contradicting statements ..." The
continued dominance of the State Department, though, despite
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some gains by the military, was demonstrated by the
rejection of abandonment of South Korea, and an implied
commitment to continue the occupation for three more years,
the length of the proposed economic aid program. 75
E. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
The proposed program to create of a strong democratic
regime in South Korea represented a substantial investment
of US resources, and the report itself was far from sanguine
in its evaluation of the prospects for obtaining these
resources. On 3 January 1947 the 80th Congress had convened
with Republican majorities in both houses, the first time in
fourteen years that the Republicans had controlled Congress.
One of their prime goals was to reduce the size of the
Federal budget. Chances seemed to improve in March, though,
when the President, in response to a crisis in Greece,
promulgated the Truman Doctrine and requested aid for Greece
and Turkey. Truman announced his belief that "it must be
the policy of the United States to support free peoples who




Despite the rhetoric, however, the Truman Doctrine as
understood by the Truman administration was merely a logical
extension of the traditional US policy of preventing
domination of Europe by any single power, and as such was
very definitely a European policy. The rhetoric was
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misleading; Acheson assured the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that aid to Greece and Turkey would not set a
precedent. 77 The United States had neither the desire nor
the resources to oppose communism throughout the world. 78
In order to obtain the resources required to stave off
the Soviet Union in Greece and Turkey, though, the President
employed sweeping language which implied a virtually
open-ended commitment to all non-Communist regimes
everywhere, the very essence of the non-sl tuat lonal
approach. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine was a
deliberate effort to educate the American people to the
realities of the postwar world: leadership did not come
without responsibilities. 79 This effort to bridge the gap
between commitments and resources, however, was hampered by
the fundamental nature of American foreign policy. As
Charles Osgood observes,
We have almost instinctively pursued limited political
ends and limited military means in response to specific
threats; but we have been disposed to talk - and in large
measure to think - in terms of policies free from such
frustrating limitations.
So, from the very start, the adminlstrat ion's policy, which
in reality was a very pragmatic pursuit of American
geopolitical interests in Europe, was couched in Idealistic,
universal terms as a battle between contending ideologies, a
struggle between the forces of good and evil, in order to
'sell the program' to the public and to Congress. 80 Rather
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than simply ask for money to protect US interests in Greece
and Turkey, Truman pontificated.
Kennan took particular exception to this aspect of the
Truman Doctrine, arguing that the national interest might at
times require the abandonment of democratic regimes, or aid
to governments, such as that of Greece, whose people were
somewhat less than free. 81 The very first study produced by
the new Policy Planning Staff under Kennan contained a
scathing critique of the Truman Doctrine. It excoriated the
idea that the doctrine was "a blank check to give economic
and military aid to any area in the world where the
communists show signs of being successful." Given the
limited resources available to the United States, the
decision to provide aid was "essentially a question of
political economy in the literal sense" and would be
considered "only in cases where the productive results bear
a satisfactory relationship to the expenditure of American
resources and effort." 82
While the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine may initially
have been just a tactic, it was not without impact. It
encouraged a simplistic view of the Cold War which in turn
restricted US flexibility in responding to subsequent
crises, Imprisoning American diplomacy in an "ideological
straitjacket." 83
39
F. FAILURE OF KOREAN AID
On 5 June 1947, Secretary of State Marshal 1 gave a
speech at Harvard calling for the rehabilitation of Europe,
the proposal which gave birth to the Marshall Plan.
Following Truman's request for aid to Greece and Turkey,
this proposal made it impossible to go to Congress with a
request for aid to Korea on top of everything else. 84 The
issue was settled when, on 27 June, Senator Arthur
Vandenburg informed Undersecretary of State Acheson that the
Republicans would oppose any new authorizations for foreign
assistance during the remainder of that congressional
term. 85
The net result of all the bureaucratic battling, then,
was a hardening of the respective Army and State positions,
each side appearing to compromise, but in reality
emphasizing its own point of view. Both agreed that the US
position in Korea was deteriorating, but they disagreed
fundamentally on how best to respond to this development.
The State Department favored a strengthened commitment as a
basis for the successful pursuit of US objectives, whereas
the military favored a rapid disengagement and withdrawal. 86
The State Department view prevailed at first, but it was
fatally undermined when Congress proved unwilling to fund
the economic aid program. Unfortunately, what this meant in
practice was that the political commitment to Korea began to
grow without a corresponding commitment of the resources
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required to make the US position in Korea viable. The gap
between resources and commitments which characterized US
foreign policy as a whole became especially acute with
regard to Korea, with those organizations which disposed of
resources--the military and especially the Congress-
avoiding a commitment, and the one organization which
favored a commi tment--the State Department--hav i ng no
resources with which to pursue its policy.
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III. CONTAINMENT
A. CONTAINMENT ACCORDING TO KENNAN
The failure to provide substantial aid to South Korea
seemed inconsistent with the rhetoric of the Truman
Doctrine, but it was completely in line with the emerging
strategy of containment. Its principal architect, George
Kennan, believed that American resources were limited and
that any viable long-term strategy for dealing with the
Soviet threat had to recognize this; in seeking to contain
the Soviet Union, the US had to exercise care and good
judgement, "to avoid permanently impairing our economy and
the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way
of life." 87 Kennan attempted to address the gap between
resources and commitments with his concept of containment.
Whereas previous strategies for dealing with the Soviet
threat had tended to expand American commitments, however,




The authoritative public statement of this doctrine,
unfortunately, was "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in which
Kennan argued that "the main element of any United States
policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term,
patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian
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expansive tendencies." 89 Containment was plagued by
misunderstanding almost from the start: Walter Lippmann
attacked containment as "a strategic monstrosity,"
criticizing it for precisely those deficiencies in the
Truman Doctrine to which Kennan had objected most
vehemently. 90 Kennan realized that his article, which had
never been Intended to be the public statement of American
policy which it became, was indeed marred by "serious
deficiencies," but his official position with the State
Department prevented him from correcting these
misunderstandings. 91
Kennan's own views on containment were considerably more
complex than the public understanding of the concept, and
Indeed did not so much emerge full blown as evolve in
response to events. Nevertheless, his thinking was fairly
consistent and mirrored official US policy from 1947 through
1 949. 92
He distinguished two main tendencies in US foreign
policy: the universal 1st lc approach, and the particularized
approach. The former tried to develop universal rules and
procedures to govern international relations, and tended to
be legalistic and mechanical; its clearest mainf estat ion in
the postwar period was the United Nations. The latter, on
the other hand, proceeded from a pessimism about the chances
of success for universal ism, and assumed that power and
considerations of mutual Interest still dominated
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International affairs. Kennan saw US foreign policy as "a
dual policy" combining both methods, but he decried
universal ism as essentially escapist; he believed that it
resulted in "a great dispersal" of American efforts.
Instead of trying to remake the world in its own image, the
US should be content with leading "the older, mellower, and
more advance nations of the world," for whom order was more
Important than mere power, and upon whom any hope for the
future rested. 93
Based on these views, Kennan did not believe that the
United States could, or even should, challenge the Soviets
at every point, a position he had made clear in his
objection to the universal ist rhetoric of the Truman
Doctrine. Limited resources demanded that interests be
prioritized; trying to be strong everywhere ran the risk of
being weak everywhere, and handed the Initiative to the
Soviet Union. 94 Kennan differentiated between vital and
peripheral interests, his principal criteria being
i ndustr ial -mi 1 i tary capacity, raw materials and secure lines
of communications. By this definition, there were only five
regions in the world which were vital: the United States,
the United Kingdom, the Rhine valley and its adjacent
industrial areas, the Soviet Union and Japan. Since only
the Soviet Union was hostile to the US, the task clearly was
to prevent the expansion of Russian influence to other vital
areas. Selected nations located near these vital areas had
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to be protected as well, but only after considering three
criteria necessary for the extension of US aid: the presence
or absence of reasonably viable local forces of resistance,
the importance of the area to US security, and the balance
between probable costs and expected results. 9^
Since the threat was defined as Russian control, a
distinction could be made between the Soviet Union and
communism. Kennan saw the threat to US security as Russian
expansionism as opposed to communist ideology. Communist
regimes were a threat to the US only to the extent that they
were controlled by the Kremlin. The victory of a communist
revolutionary movement, therefore, while It was unfortunate,
perhaps even tragic, did not necessarily represent a threat
to US security. Kennan believed that Moscow's policies,
which he perceived to be imperialistic, contained the seeds
of their own destruction. "Stalinist dogma" was most
appealing to non-Russian communists when they were
revolutionaries in need of Soviet support, but once they
came Into power their Interests would Inevitably diverge
from those of Moscow and come into conflict with the
Kremlin's "colonial policy." The US could not, at least in
the near term, hope to spread democracy to countries where
it was "alien to their culture and tradition," since this
would only result in "an indefinitely continuing burden of
political, economic and military responsibility for the
survival of the uncertain regimes which we had placed in
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power." Instead, the best approach would be to promote
"Communist heresy," relying on the force of nationalism to
create non-Stalinist regimes, even if they were communist.
The objective was not the eradication of communism but the
elimination of "satellite subservience" to Moscow. 96
Finally, Kennan believed the Soviet threat to be largely
psychological, essentially a crisis of confidence. The
Soviet Union pursued its goal of world domination by means
of "aggressive pressure from without and militant
revolutionary subversion from within," but neither wanted
nor expected another war. 97 What was required to meet this
threat, therefore, was "not the containment by military
means of a military threat, but the political containment of
a pol Itlcal threat." 98
Kennan was particularly pessimistic about American
chances of effecting developments in Asia. Although he
predicted that American success in stopping the Soviets in
Europe would cause them to turn to Asia, he felt that the
region was "in a state of almost total instability," and
that the "enormous" task of bringing "order out of chaos"
was probably beyond the capacity of the US. 99 American
ideas and institutions had little relevance for the Asian
masses, who were far more likely to be attracted by the
blandishments of communist ideology. Because of this, he
predicted that it was "not only possible, but probable, that
. . . many peoples will fall, for varying periods, under the
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influence of Moscow." This was "probably unavoidable;"
rather than Indulge in "sentimentality and day-dreaming"
about "unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising
of living standards, and democratization," the US needed to
evaluate the region to determine which areas were absolutely
essential to its security. If American control of these
areas could be assured, there would be "no serious threat to
our security from the East within our time." 100
In differentiating between vital and peripheral
interests, the Asian mainland was clearly peripheral; the
loss of the countries bordering the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan to Korea would be regrettable, but would not
immediately endanger American security. 101 This
understanding formed the basis for a situational approach to
US commitments in Asia, an approach by which Korea was
clearly peripheral and ultimately expendable. At the same
time, however, there were countervailing forces in
Washington who argued for a nonsi tuat ional approach. These
forces, centered in the State Department, were initially
dominant, and succeeded in extending the American occupation
of Korea.
B. THE DEBATE OVER SIGNIFICANCE
The main point of contention was the importance of Korea
to US security. This disagreement had surfaced in earlier
debates on US policy in Korea, but It intensified following
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the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, In large part due
to the Army's growing concern over the gap between available
strength and potential commitments. The War Department was
attempting to bring the costly and troublesome occupation in
Korea to an early end. In a SWNCC meeting on 29 January
1947, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson had characterized
Korea as M the single most urgent problem now facing the War
Department." 102 Occupation costs were more than SI million
per day, a considerable sum considering the draconian cuts
which had been made in the defense budget. 103
Immediately following the release of the
Interdepartmental Committee's draft report, Assistant
Secretary of War Howard Peterson began to openly and
actively advocate withdrawal, arguing basically that the US
should 'get out while the getting is good'. 104 In a 4 April
1947 letter to Dean Acheson , then Acting Secretary of State,
Secretary Patterson expressed his concern over the
"potentially explosive" situation in Korea, which he called
"the most difficult occupation area to maintain," and
reiterated the military's fear of a "precipitate withdrawal
under conditions gravely detrimental to our position in the
Far East and in the world." He rejected the State
Department approach, questioning the willingness of Congress
to appropriate the considerable funds proposed for Korean
rehabilitation, and arguing that, even if these funds were
made available, no program, "no matter how enlightened,"
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would "satisfy the intense Korean desire for independence."
Since "decreasing funds and manpower" would force the Army
to drop "the least remunerative" of its programs, a
categorization which Patterson clearly applied to Korea, he
advocated a rapid disengagement: " I am convinced that the
United States should pursue forcefully a course of action
whereby we get out of Korea at an early date and believe all
our measures should have early withdrawal as their
overriding objective." 105
The War Department position was fully articulated in JCS
1769/1, a 29 April 1947 report by the Joint Strategic Survey
Committee (JSSC). Evaluating assistance to other countries
from the standpoint of national security, Korea was rated
fourth out of fifteen in terms of need, but second to last
in terms of importance to US national security. The report
acknowledged the issue of US prestige in Korea, noting that
it was "the one country within which we alone have for
almost two years carried on ideological warfare In direct
contact with our opponents," and agreeing that the loss of
Korea to the Russians would be "gravely detrimental to
United States prestige, and therefore security, throughout
the world." Abandoning the struggle in Korea "would tend to
confirm the suspicion that the United States is not really
determined to accept the responsibilities of world
leadership," and this perception would hamper US efforts "to
bolster those countries of western Europe which are of
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primary and vital importance to our national security."
Having stated what was in essence the State Department
position, though, the report went on to refute it. It
argued that doubts about US resolve "could quite possibly be
dissipated," and that US prestige in Europe could in fact be
"enhanced," if "abandonment of further aid to Korea" was
Justified as a reprogrammi ng of limited resources to "areas
of greater strategic importance." It was concluded that
"current assistance should be given to Korea only if the
means exist after sufficient assistance has been given the
countries of primary Importance . . ." While the United
States could not afford to lose Korea to the Soviets, it
could actually gain by announcing that Korea was not
important, and simply walking away. Instead of Korea, the
report advocated aid to Japan, which it called "the most
important arena of Ideological struggle within our Pacific
area of defense commi tments.
"
10 ^
At a 7 May 1947 SWNCC meeting, Patterson reiterated the
War Department position, stressing the expense of continued
occupation and "the insignificance of the strategic and
economic value of Korea." Secretary of State George
Marshall disagreed with Patterson. 107 Instead of abandoning
Korea, the State Department once again sought to negotiate
with the Soviets to achieve the objectives of the Moscow
Agreement. The Russians agreed, and the Joint Commission,
adjourned since May 1946, met in Seoul on 22 May 1947. 108
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The Soviets, however, soon made it apparent that they were
still determined to exclude rightist elements from
participating in the creation of a Korean government, and
the talks became deadlocked by 2 July.
The stalemate in the Joint Commission, capping as it did
an almost total lack of progress on the part of the US
occupation toward the creation of an independent Korean
government, resulted in a further deterioration of the
political situation in Korea, with little prospect for
improvement in the forseeable future. The Russians would
not negotiate, the Congress would not provide the resources
required to create a viable state In southern Korea, and the
Army simply wanted to get out. Joseph Jacobs, the new
Political Adviser in Korea, concluded that what was required
was a "major reorientation of United States policy with
respect to Korea." 109 SWNCC appointed an Ad Hoc Committee,
consisting of John Allison from the State Department,
Lieutenant Colonel T.N. Dupuy from the War Department, and
Captain H.R. Hummer from the Navy Department, to study and
report on the situation in Korea. 110
The 4 August 1947 report of this Ad Hoc Committee,
labeled SWNCC 176/30, was a further significant evolution of
US policy toward Korea. 111 While it repeated the familiar
arguments concerning US prestige, and reaffirmed that the
United States could not withdraw from Korea, it moved
official policy closer to the War Department position:
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"Every effort should be made ... to liquidate or reduce
the U.S. commitment of men and money in Korea as soon as
possible without abandoning Korea to Soviet domination." In
a twist on the earlier War Department argument, it added
that "serious Internal disorders" in Korea might lead the
American public to "require the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Korea," an outcome which would "almost certainly result
In the complete domination of Korea by the Soviet Union,
with grave consequences to U.S. prestige and world-wide
political objectives." 112 While the US could not simply
leave under present circumstances, its objective now would
be to change those circumstances so that withdrawal would be
possible, a sort of 'constructive disengagement' . This was
clearly less ambitious than the previous proposal to develop
South Korea into a compelling showpiece of democracy and
capitalism at work in Asia, but, in light of the
administration failure to sell this approach to the
Congress, there seemed little alternative.
There were three elements to the new policy. First, if
the Joint Commission negotiations continued to be
stalemated, the United States would submit the Korean
problem to the United Nations at the beginning of the next
General Assembly session on 16 September. Second, the
possibility of abandoning the long-time objective of
reunification under a trusteeship was finally accepted: "the
U.S. government must be prepared for the possible necessity
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of granting independence to south Korea." Finally, the
report called for submission of Grant-in-Aid legislation to
the next session of Congress; economic assistance was now
seen explicitly as a concomitant of disengagement. 113
There was further movement toward disengagement during
the next few months, abetted in part by a significant change
in personnel at the State Department. In rapid succession,
Dean Acheson was replaced as Undersecretary of State by
Robert A. Lovett, John Carter Vincent turned over his post
as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to W.
Walton Butterworth, and John H. Hilldring was replaced by
Charles E. Saltzman as Assistant Secretary of State for
Occupied Areas. 114 As a result, there was a temporary lack
of continuity in the State Department's handling of the
Korea issue, and a corresponding ferment in policy
discussions. At the same time, George Kennan, as head of
the new Policy Planning Staff, began to exert a substantial
influence on the formulation of US foreign policy.
The extent of the growing consensus to get out of Korea
was illustrated by a 9 September 1947 memo from Francis B.
Stevens, Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European
Affairs, to Kennan and Allison, the Assistant Chief of the
Division of Northeast Asian Affairs. Stevens expressed his
concern about what he perceived to be "a fairly unanimous
agreement to abandon the Koreans to their fate," arguing
that this might be "a rather short-sighted policy from the
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standpoint of our long-range interests." He advocated the
global Importance of such an act in the context of the
"ideological struggle between East and West," stating that
"individual political acts may have an importance far beyond
their immediate local consequences," the essence of the
nonsi tuat i onal approach. 115
The most forceful counterargument, surprisingly, was
made from Korea by Jacobs. In a 19 September 1947 cable in
which he analyzed Korea policy, Jacobs stated that, while he
agreed that the failure of the Joint Commission required a
new approach, he could not concur with the policy outlined
in SWNCC 176/30, which would establish a "more or less
permanent government in South Korea," without taking into
account "the carefully studied answer of United States
military strategists" to one key qestion: "is Korea of
sufficiently vital importance Cto] the United States in its
relations with the Soviet Union within the forseeable future
(for the next 5 years) for the United States to undertake
the risk and expense of holding South Korea?" If the answer
was yes, the United States should proceed with all haste to
create a viable South Korea; in a prescient observation,
Jacobs argued that there would be a cost for pursuing this
course of action: "the United States would probably be
compelled ... to station along the 38th parallel more or
less permanently at least 1 division of well-trained
American troops . . . and we should have to train and equip
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a South Korean Army of considerable size." If, on the other
hand, the answer to the question was no, the United States
should reconcile its differences with the Soviet Union and
"get out of Korea as quickly and as gracefully as possible."
Jacobs acknowledged that "there are those who will criticize
this plan because the United States may lose "prestige"
among Far Eastern peoples," but, as the JSSC had earlier, he
rejected this argument, though for a different reason which
reflected his own perspective: "any plan devised for uniting
Korea and for withdrawal of troops will be readily accepted
by the Koreans who seem to be willing to take the risks
involved." Finally, and most profoundly, he questioned the
ability of the United States to create 'democracy in South
Korea without the willing acquiescence of the Koreans
themse 1 ves:
we cannot give democracy, as we know it, to any people or
cram it down their throats. History cries loudly that the
fruits of democracy come forth only after long evolution-
ary and revolutionary processes involving the expenditure
of treasure, blood and tears. Money cannot buy it; out-
side force and pressure cannot nurture it. 116
Jacobs argument demonstrates the extent to which the
State Department had moved toward the Army perspective,
prompted in part by the clear hopelessness of negotiations
in the Joint Commission, and in part by continuing
opposition and unrest in South Korea. They also demonstrate
the Impact of the new strategy of containment. The American
commitment in Korea was being evaluated, in light of limited
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resources, in terms of its military value to the US in its
confrontation with the Soviet Union. The political value of
creating democracy in Korea was discounted because of the
low probability, painfully apparent to someone as close to
the scene as Jacobs was, of succeeding in such an
undertaking. Jacobs, however, went even farther than SWNCC
176/30 by suggesting that, if the US was not prepared to
commit the resources necessary to hold South Korea, it
should simply walk away and leave the Koreans to settle
their own problems, an opportunity which all parties then
seemed eager to have. He correctly foresaw the implicit
commitment inherent in any American effort to create a
separate state in its zone of occupation.
A third document from this period deserves mention, if
for no other reason than its surprising lack of impact on
Korea policy. This was the report to the President by
Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer on the situation in
China and Korea. Wedemeyer , toured Northeast Asia and
presented his report on 19 September, at the height of the
discussions on Korea. He concluded that the withdrawal of
US forces would result in "the creation of a Soviet
satellite Communist regime in all of Korea," and that this
outcome "would cost the United States an Immense loss in
moral prestige among the people of Asia," and result in a
corresponding gain in prestige for the Soviets, especially
in those areas bordering the Soviet Union. Specifically, he
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feared that there would be "serious repurcussions" in
Japan. 117 But Wedemeyer's concerns did little to slow the
building momentum in favor of withdrawal.
A factor which was far more significant, if not
decisive, was the brief involvement of George Kennan in the
formulation of Korea policy. Despite his disavowal of any
role in the formulation of Korea policy prior to the Korean
War, the large scale personnel turnover in State referred to
above created a temporary void into which Kennan stepped.
His influence appears to have been largely responsible for
the sudden shift in the State Department position at the end
of September 1947. ^8 The Army position was certainly more
akin to Kennan / s views on containment than those previously
espoused by the State Department to Justify a continued US
presence in Korea. Kennan wrote a memo to Butterworth on 24
September 1947 in which he outlined the position of the
Policy Planning Staff (PPS) on Korea. Based on the
understanding that Korea was not "militarily essential,"
Kennan recommended that US policy should be "to cut our
losses and get out of there as gracefully but promptly as
possible." 119 Two weeks later, in PPS 13, Kennan made it
clear that there was also another reason for getting out of
Korea. Not only did it lack direct military significance,
but the prospects of success there were dim. Because Korean
politics were "dominated by political immaturity,
intolerance and violence," there was "no longer any real
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hope of a genuinely peaceful and free democratic
development" in Korea. The US could not rely on the Koreans
themselves for support in creating the conditions of
stability required to stop the spread of Soviet influence, a
key criteria for the extension of US aid. Since Korea was
also not "of decisive strategic importance," America's "main
task" should be "to extricate ourselves without too great a
loss of prest ige . " ^20
Consideration of Korea's strategic importance was
clearly central to the entire argument. On this issue,
though, the military occupied an unassailable position. The
State Department, while it might contend that a continued US
presence was needed for political reasons, could not contest
the professional Judgement of the military on a strictly
military issue. At this critical juncture, on 26 September,
the Joint Chiefs delivered their definitive judgement on
Korea from the military perspective: "from the standpoint of
military security, the United States has little strategic
interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in
Korea ..." They argued that the US forces in Korea were
not strong enough to make any significant contribution in
the event of a war, and in any event would not be necessary,
since any offensive operation would probably bypass Korea,
and the peninsula could be most effectively denied to the
enemy by air forces based elsewhere. They also reiterated
their concern about the tenuousness of the US military
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position in Korea In the event of severe internal disorder.
Their bottom line was that, considering "the present severe
shortage of military manpower , " the troops in Korea, as well
as the money spent there, "could well be used elsewhere." 121
It was the confluence of these three factors - growing US
responsibilities elsewhere in the world, reduced resources
available to meet these commitments, and continuing disorder
in South Korea - that caused the Joint Chiefs to make their
declaration. 122 The last factor, though, in causing the
State Department to reevaluate the likelihood of success in
Korea, may very well have tipped the balance.
The issue was taken up at a high-level State Department
meeting on 29 September, attended by Marshall, Lovett,
Kennan, Butterworth, Rusk and Allison. In a major departure
from the earlier State Department position, it was agreed
that "ultimately the US position in Korea is untenable even
with the expenditure of considerable US money and effort,"
and that therefore "it should be the effort of the
Government through all proper means to effect a settlement
of the Korean problem which would enable the US to withdraw
from Korea as soon as possible with the minimum of bad
effects." Part of this process was submission of the Korea
question to the United Nations. 123 The debate between
/ holding the line' all along the Soviet periphery versus
applying the containment strategy as Kennan envisioned it,
concentrating limited resources on the areas which were
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truly vital to US security, seemed to be finally settled,
and the way was clear for the withdrawal of US forces.
Many analysts interpret the Truman administration's
decision to refer the Korean problem to the UN as an
indication of its desire to cast aside an unwanted burden.
Gregory Henderson, for example, labels the whole policy "a
smokescreen" behind which the United States planned to
abandon "a fragile, complex and tangential Korea. m1 24
Matray disagrees, arguing that the involvement of the
international community was "an essential part of Truman's
containment strategy in Korea." In his view, the imprimatur
of the UN was intended to convey added legitimacy to the
South Korean government which it appeared increasingly
likely would have to be created, and prompt Congress to
provide the funds required for aid and rehabilitation. 125
It seems clear, though, that containment excluded Korea.
Far from wanting to sink more resources into an area which
had been determined to be peripheral and not very promising,
the US was seeking to liquidate an unwise investment. This
is not to say that US efforts to help South Korea were
entirely cynical. There was definitely a sincere intent to
create as viable a state in South Korea as was deemed
possible under the circumstances. But this objective was
not the result of altruism; the goal was to minimize US
losses. This was a limited goal, and it would only warrant
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the commitment of equally limited resources. Policy makers
were starting to look beyond the Korean tangle. While the
United States wasn't willing to leave Korea just yet, it was
definitely starting to look for an exit.
C. DELAY OF WITHDRAWAL
Almost as soon as the State Department signed on in
support of withdrawal, however, it began to backtrack,
renewing its arguments on the geopolitical importance of
Korea and attempting to delay withdrawal while concurrently
pursuing an approach to the UN in an attempt to salvage as
much as possible of the original US goals in Korea. 126
Secretary of State Marshal 1 put the issue of Korean
independence before the United Nations in an address to the
General Assembly on 17 September 1947; in a resolution on 14
November, the General Assembly, based on a US proposal,
established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
(UNTCOK), and called for elections not later than 31 March
1948
to choose representatives with whom the Commission may
consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and
independence of the Korean people and which represen-
tatives, constituting a National Assembly, may establish a
National Government of Korea.
The resolution also recommended that the new National
Government should "arrange with the occupying Powers for the
complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as
early as practicable and if possible within ninety days,"
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language to which the military was to refer repeatedly in
its dispute with the State Department over withdrawal. 127
UNTCOK held its first meeting at Seoul on 12 January
1948, but was refused permission to enter North Korea by the
Soviet Commander. In a 17 February memo, Niles Bond, the
Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs,
expressed concern that "those who oppose the withdrawal of
US occupation forces" might construe this development as
rendering the UN resolution "inoperative," and, in an early
indication of the resurgence of State Department advocacy of
continued occupation, argued that the State Department
"should at least be giving some thought to the possibility
that we may be obliged to persuade the Army to keep its
powder dry so far as withdrawal is concerned, and to stand
pat in South Korea at least until the next session of the GA
[General Assembly]." 128 Bond's concerns did not, however,
prove warranted; on 26 February the Interim Committee of the
General Assembly adopted a US-sponsored resolution
instructing UNTCOK to proceed with elections in those parts
of Korea to which it had access. 129
Nevertheless, the State Department, moving a little
further along the path which Bond had blazed, began to
reconsider its earlier support of the Army's withdrawal
plans. In a 4 March 1948 memo, Butterworth observed that
while the United States was committed to withdrawal under
the 14 November 1947 UN resolution, it was also "morally
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committed . . .to withdraw only after the creation of
reasonably adequate security forces, and under circumstances
which will bequeath to the newly established government at
least an even chance of survival." He argued that, because
of this, a firm timetable for withdrawal could not be
established; the US had to create a viable economy and
adequate security forces in South Korea before it could pull
out its troops. He made three specific recommendations, all
of which affected the Army: he called on the Army to
"maintain flexibility in its plans for the withdrawal of
occupation forces from South Korea," urged the Army to
"expedite to the fullest extent possible its program for the
training and equipping of South Korean security forces,"
and, In the biggest slap to the military, recommended that
"the necessary legislative steps be taken to assure the
continued availability of Army funds for the relief and
rehabilitation of south Korea after the withdrawal of U.S.
occupation forces." 130 This last point must have been
especially galling to the Army, which after all was
interested in getting out of Korea in large part to free
limited resources for use elsewhere.
This renewed divergence between the State Department and
Army positions on Korea led to the creation of a compromise
document, NSC 8, produced by the newly created National
Security Council and adopted at its ninth meeting on 2
April. The fact that it was a compromise is critical in
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understanding NSC 8, which Kim calls "two contradictory
documents in one." Both the Army and the State Department
succeeded in inserting sections supporting their positions;
in the bureaucratic struggle which followed, each side
appealed selectively to those provisions. 131
NSC 8 started with a restatement of US objectives in
Korea, but it added a new "derivative objective":
"terminating the military commitment of the U.S. in Korea as
soon as practicable" consistent with the other objectives.
The military thereby received support for withdrawal, but
the State Department had one important caveat: withdrawal
would not be at the expense of the basic objectives. 132
The report went on to provide a rather gloomy estimate
of the US position in Korea. The effort to create a
democratic government in Korea was "handicapped by the
political immaturity of the Korean people," especially their
tendency "to polarize into extremes of right and left and to
pursue their ends through the use of violence." The Korean
economy was if anything even worse: "it is estimated that
economic collapse would ensue in south Korea within a matter
of weeks after the termination of U.S. aid to that area."
Despite these difficulties, however, the United States
could not allow the Soviets to dominate the entire Korean
peninsula. This would "enhance the political and strategic
position" of the USSR in the region, at the expense of the
US positions in China and Japan. Withdrawal might also "be
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interpreted as a betrayal by the U.S. of its friends and
allies in the Far East and might well lead to a fundamental
realignment of forces in favor of the Soviet Union
throughout that part of the world." This was the standard
argument, but a significant new twist was added: this
outcome could be avoided if "the U.S., upon withdrawal, left
sufficient indigenous military strength to enable south
Korea to defend itself against any but an overt act of
aggression." Finally, reflecting the new importance of
Korea as a test of the United Nations, it was pointed out
that overthrow of the South Korean government created under
the auspices of the UN would "constitute a severe blow to
the prestige and Influence of the UN."
Based on these considerations, the US had three possible
course of action: abandon Korea, establish a viable
government in South Korea as a means of liquidating the US
commitment, or guarantee the Independence and territorial
integrity of Korea against both internal and external
threats. In the best tradition of bureaucratic
decision-making, the desired course of action was sandwiched
between two obviously unacceptable extremes. Not
surprisingly, the middle option was selected, and the report
recommended that the United States "effect a settlement of
the Korean problem which would enable the U.S. to withdraw
from Korea as soon as possible with the minimum of bad
effects." At first glance this seemed to be the same
65
position adopted in September, but a renewed emphasis was
being placed on the creation of stable conditions in Korea
prior to US withdrawal.
In order to create conditions which would make
withdrawal acceptable, it was concluded that the US should
expedite plans for developing the South Korean constabulary
into a security force, and complete the planned GARIOA and
rehabilitation plans for fiscal year 1949 "to aid in
forestalling the economic collapse of south Korea," a modest
enough goal. These efforts were to be geared to the
creation of conditions for withdrawal by 31 December 1948.
Finally, there was a word of caution which seems quite
ironic in light of subsequent developments: "The U.S. should
not become so Irrevocably involved in the Korean situation
that any action taken by any faction in Korea or by any
other power in Korea could be considered a casus belli for
the U.S."
The two distinct lines of reasoning in NSC 8 make it a
difficult document on which to base any conclusions about US
policy, except perhaps to say that, inasmuch as the basic
conflict between the military and diplomatic views had not
been resolved, there was no clear policy. The report seems
to say that Korea is important--the State Department view-
but that the US should get out anyway— the Army view. The
compromise seems to be on the process: the US will withdraw
its forces, but only after creating conditions in South
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Korea which will give the Koreans a fighting chance at
survival after withdrawal. The implication is that the
ultimate fate of Korea is not as important as the perception
among allies and opponents alike that Korea was not simply
abandoned by the United States.
Matray disagrees with this interpretation, arguing
Instead that "Truman's approval of NSC 8 was indicative of
his desire to pursue a middle road in responding to the
Soviet challenge in Korea. "133 gu t ,t seems just as
reasonable to see his approval as the act of an indecisive
President taking the middle road between the positions of
the two dominant bureaucracies in the government. Pelz sees
the decision to withdraw and turn the problem over to the UN
as another example of satisf icing. He argues that, by
withdrawing the occupation forces, the US terminated its
real commitment to Korea, but maintained "a primarily verbal
commitment" to please the State Department. The result, a
commitment based on "words and limited aid, but not deeds",
was what he calls "a policy of bluff". 134 The middle road,
providing economic and political support for those nations
on the periphery of the Soviet bloc which were deemed
important but not sufficiently vital to the US to justify a
military commitment, was credible only so long as the
Soviets did not call the US bluff.
Matray, however, contends that the administration really
believed that this approach would work. In his view,
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Truman and his advisers were optimistic about the
prospects for successful containment in Korea. The
economic recovery and political stability the Koreans
could achieve with American aid and advice would frustrate
the Soviet strategy of expansion. South Korea would
emerge as a viable, democratic Asian nation capable of
self-defense and worthy of emulation. 135
This contention, however, seems inconsistent with the rather
pessimistic assessment of the Korean situation contained in
NSC 8, as well as the overall tone of the document, which
seems to accept the possibility of a collapse in South Korea
so long as it is not tied too closely to the US withdrawal.
At any rate, the real issue is the lack of any apparent
planning for the contingency of failure. While the Truman
administration may have sincerely believed that its policy
of assistance to South Korea could succeed in the absence of
a military threat, the proper US response in the event of
such a threat, however unlikely, does not appear to have
been thought through. This omission reflects the unsettled
nature of US Korea policy: even after years of debate, the
fundamental dispute between the nonsi tuat ional and
situational views remained unresolved. The resultant US
policy was the product of an uneasy compromise.
D. THE ARMY PUSH
The Army had no doubts; from its perspective, nothing
should be allowed to stand in the way of the rapid execution
of the agreed troop withdrawal. It did not really share the
State Department's concern with the intangible political
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consequences, and was consequently far less interested in
achieving political objectives which could only delay
withdrawal and consume scarce resources which the Army had
long since concluded were more urgently needed elsewhere.
This position was, if anything, strengthened by events in
early 1948. When, on 12 January 1948, Truman presented to
Congress his budget request for fiscal year 1948, defense
was allocated only *11 billion. The Army was budgeted
560,000 men, but by the end of March it was 22,000 below
that figure due to low enlistments. 136
These force levels were dangerously low in light of
potential commitments. At an 18 February White House
meeting, Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, the Director of
the Joint Staff of the JCS, stated that if a commitment of
military forces were made in any of "the possible explosive
points in the world," which he identified as Greece, Italy,
Korea and Palestine, US reserves would be reduced to "a
dangerous degree." Use of more than a division in any area
would require partial mobilization. 137 The military's
worries were heightened by the crisis of March 1948,
precipitated by the twin shocks of the Soviet coup in
Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the Berlin blockade, but
in reality the result of concern over the lack of success of
US efforts In Greece and Turkey, the growing momentum of the
Communists in China, and the problem in Palestine. 138
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These developments Intensified the Army's previous
reluctance to accept any delay in liquidating the position
in Korea. Army Undersecretary William H. Draper clearly
conveyed this message in a 3 May 1948 missive to Lovett in
which he complained about the activities of UNTCOK In Korea,
citing the Commission's inclination "to misjudge the
realities of the situation in Korea in considering an
idealistic application of the UN resolutions." Stressing
the passage in NSC 8 calling for withdrawal by 31 December
1948, he argued that it "would therefore be contrary to US
interests" If developments in the UN led to a prolongation
of the occupation. 139
The mechanics of ending the occupation, however, served
to deepen the US commitment in Korea while simultaneously
eroding its foundation. The creation of an indigenous
authority within South Korea linked American credibility to
the viability of the ROK government. Elections for a
National Assembly were held in the south on 10 May 1948, and
Syngman Rhee was elected as the first President of the
Republic of Korea on 20 July. US Military Government was
terminated on 15 August, and the process of transfering
authority to the new government of the ROK began. There
was, in this regard, no turning back. 140
This evolutionary change heightened the State
Department's perception of Korea's importance. Lovett,
responding to Draper on 19 May 1948, referred selectively to
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the section of NSC 8 which advocated UN involvement, and
emphasized that it was the State Department's
conviction that the extent to which we may be successful
in minimizing the possible ill effects of our withdrawal
from Korea will depend in large measure upon the extent to
which the authority of the UN is associated with the
program of which that withdrawal is a part.
The timetable for withdrawal, by implication, had to take a
back seat to the creation of conditions which would minimize
the political cost to the United States. 141 This position
was elaborated in a 23 June 1948 letter from Marshall to
Army Secretary Kenneth Royal 1. While conceding that Army
plans for withdrawal "would appear to be entirely consistent
with" NSC 8, the Secretary of State argued that "the present
world situation" and "the inescapable effect which our
actions in Korea will have upon that situation" necessitated
that "sufficient flexibility should be maintained in the
preparation and execution of withdrawal plans" to allow for




The Army, however, having finally been given a date upon
which to base plans for withdrawal, was not about to show
any flexibility. Royal 1 , responding the same day, observed
that the Army was doing its part to create the conditions
outlined in NSC 8, and was therefore "proceeding on the
assumption that conditions will be fulfilled which will
permit the withdrawal of U.S. Occupation Forces from Korea
by 31 December 1948 as envisaged in NSC No. 8." 143
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The State Department did not concede the point, though,
and once again, in an 8 July 1948 letter from Lovett to
Royal 1, insisted that Army withdrawal plans should be
"sufficiently flexible to provide for suspension, delay or
other adjustment consistent with the extent of achievement
of U.S. policy objectives" in Korea. 144
This desire to delay withdrawal was a manifestation of a
more sweeping reevaluation taking place in the State
Department. Jacobs, for example, who had so forcefully
questioned further US involvement in Korea the previous
September, sent a cable on 26 May 1948 which revealed a
change of heart. Noting that his earlier comments had been
made in a "spirit of frustration and defeatism," he observed
that "that atmosphere has changed and a spirit and a wi 1 1 to
meet [the] dangers that face us, consistent with our
strength and prestige and with [the] hopes of other peoples
who must stand or fall with us, is resurgent." He argued
that this new spirit required a reevaluation of the
decisions which had been made during the earlier period so
that US actions in Korea would not "belie what we are doing
to [the] contrary elsewhere." 145 More specifically, in a 12
August telegram, he argued that the US
should stand firm everywhere on [the] Soviet perimeter,
including Korea, until we know more clearly what actions
will be taken in [the] General Assembly and what will be
[the] outcome of our present negotiations with respect to
Berlin and the rest of Germany.
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Butterworth agreed with this recommendation, and in a 17
August memo urged that public announcement of the troop
withdrawal be postponed until the General Assembly, which
was scheduled to convene on 21 September, had the
opportunity to consider the situation in Korea. 14^
In part, Jacobs'' change of heart was a reaction to moves
which the Truman administration was taking to strengthen the
military in response to the March crisis. The JCS had
recommended a supplemental appropriation for fiscal year
1949 to bring available strength closer to obligations, and
it was obviously felt that an increase in resources would
allow the US to reconsider some commitments, such as Korea,
which had earlier been unsupportabl e . But Truman wanted to
limit the supplemental appropriation to $1.5 billion.
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal wanted an increase of
349,500 men - 240,000 for the Army - at an estimated cost of
S3 billion, and the services came in with a "minimum"
program totaling $9 billion. Forrestal finally submitted a
request for S3. 481 billion, most of which was approved by
Congress, but the balance was critically altered. The Army
ultimately received only a slight increase in manpower, and
funding for Universal Military Training, a favored project
of Secretary of State Marshall and the Army's best hope for
dealing with its manpower problems, was eliminated in favor
of a build-up of the Air Force. 147
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Having already postponed the planned commencement of
withdrawal from 15 August to 15 September, the Army now
began to push forward with the reduction of occupation
forces in Korea, and indicated that 15 November was "the
date beyond which continued withdrawal would make the
occupation untenable." 148
At this point, the South Koreans themselves, despite
their earlier vehement opposition to the occupation, made a
request for "the retention of U.S. occupation forces in
Korea for the time being," counting their presence, along
with the development of security forces and the continuation
of economic assistance, as "essential elements" of US
support for the fledgling ROK government. Dr. Cho Pyong Ok,
the Special Representative of President Rhee , told Lovett
"without hesitation" that the North Koreans would attack
South Korea if all occupation forces were withdrawn, and
urged the United States to "not forsake Korea." 149 The ROK
National Assembly on 20 November formally requested the
retention of US forces in Korea until ROK security forces
were strong enough to maintain order. ^O
This belated shift in the position of the ROK government
was in response to the 19 October Yosu rebellion, as well as
the impending release to North Korea of troops previously
fighting with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria. The
revolt of the ROK 14th Regiment at Yosu highlighted the
seriousness of the problems facing the Rhee government.
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Despite its contention that the uprising "quickly lost
momentum because it failed to gain sympathizers from the
populace," the revolt had in fact spread to several
surrounding towns, supported by widespread opposition to the
government and the police, and a major operation was
required to quell it. 151
John Muccio, the U.S. Representative to the ROK
,
described the regime in Seoul as "an incompetent government
without strong public support and adequate security forces
faced with prepared rebellious Communist internal elements
and superior hostile external military force," a situation
he characterized, with some understatement, as "grave." He
suggested, though, that there was hope that a stable economy
might eventually be developed, which might lead to the
creation of a stable government. While the continued
presence of US troops was "no panacea," and South Korean
unity was more important that mere military strength, he
argued that a temporary extension of the occupation to give
the ROK government a "period of grace" would be
"indispensable" if it was to have any chance of successfully
resolving its difficulties. 152
On 9 November 1948 Saltzman wrote to Wedemeyer , who was
at that time the Army's Director of Plans and Operations, to
indicate the latest State Department position:
it would be premature and prejudicial to the interests of
the U.S. to enter into the final and irreversible stages
of troop withdrawal from Korea before the UN General
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Assembly has had an opportunity at its present session to
consider and take action upon the Korea problem.
As a result, the State Department did not want the reduction
of forces in Korea then underway to progress beyond "the
critical point" earlier set at 15 November. 153
In response to these concerns, the Army on 15 November
directed General MacArthur to retain one regimental combat
team of 7500 men in Korea. But the General Assembly's
passage on 12 December of a resolution recognizing the
Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in Korea
seemed to remove the State Department's last objection to
withdrawal. In addition, the impending withdrawal of all
Soviet forces from North Korea by the end of December 1948,
which had been announced on 18 September, placed pressure on
the US to end the occupation lest it appear less willing
than the Russians to comply with the wishes of the General
Assembly. Draper, responding to Saltzman's earlier
communication, requested that the State Department agree to
initiation of withdrawal on 1 February 1949, with completion
scheduled for 31 March 1949. 154
At this juncture, on 17 December, Bishop and Bond
drafted a memo which represented "a bold effort within the
State Department to reinstate the ambiguous and optimistic
geopolitics of earlier years." 155 They proposed to review
the conclusion of NSC 8, evaluating US policy in Korea "as
part of an overall Pacific policy based upon the fundamental
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national objectives as well as the security requirements of
the United States in the Far East as a whole." They argued
that "the question of withdrawal must be linked to the
larger question of the probable repurcussions of such
withdrawal throughout Northeast Asia." In particular, they
observed that if the communists dominated the entire Korean
peninsula Japan would be surrounded on three sides; this
would result in "an intensification of efforts to bring
Japan within the sphere of communist power" and "among the
Japanese an even greater uneasiness flowing from their
exposed position." In light of these considerations, they
advocated a basic reexamination of the withdrawal
decision . 156
As a result of this renewed divergence of opinion over
withdrawal, the issue was once again referred to the
National Security Council; General MacArthur's views were
also solicited, "with particular reference to the possible
repurcussions of such withdrawal on our position in Japan."
The State Department meanwhile refused to agree to the Army
proposal to Initiate withdrawal on 1 February 1949,
contending that, despite the successful resolution of the
Korean question in the United Nations, "other developments
have in the meantime served to underline the grave risks
which the United States would incur in completing the
withdrawal of its occupation forces from Korea at the
present time," perhaps a reference to events in China. ^7
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Based on the recommendation of MacArthur, the Army again
agreed to delay the completion of withdrawal, this time
until 10 May 1949, the anniversary of the elections in South
Korea. The State Department, however, declined to discuss
the issue pending completion of the ongoing NSC review. 158
Royal 1 then traveled to Japan to meet with MacArthur, and
stopped in Seoul, where he met with Rhee and Muccio. His
account of this meeting stated that Rhee "would have no
objection to us getting out at once" if the US would beef up
its Advisory Mission and provide "a reasonable amount of
additional arms," but Muccio, in an annex, diplomatically
labeled Royal Ts phrasing "somewhat too specific." He
suggested 30 June 1949 as the "best target date for the
completion of withdrawal," provided adequate equipment and
training had been provided to the ROK security forces by
then. 159
The withdrawal question was finally settled when the
National Security Council review of NSC 8 was approved on 22
March 1949 as NSC 8/2. 16° After reviewing developments in
Korea since NSC 8, and repeating the arguments for US
involvement in Korea in largely the same words used in the
earlier study, NSC 8/2 concluded that the US still had
basically the same three options: abandon Korea, guarantee
it unconditionally, or,
as a middle course . . . establish within practicable and
feasible limits conditions of support of the Government of
the Republic of Korea as a means of facilitating the
78
reduction of the U.S. commitment of men and money in Korea
while at the same time minimizing to the greatest
practicable extent the chances of south Korean being
brought under Communist domination as a consequence of the
withdrawal of U.S. armed forces.
This was the course of action which NSC 8 had advocated, and
which the US was pursuing. The State Department, however,
by continually delaying withdrawal, had clearly been
attempting to retain US forces in Korea as an adjunct to the
programs of economic, military and political support. NSC
8/2 rejected this approach, concluding that while US
assistance must continue, it should "not be dependent upon
the continued presence of" US forces in Korea. It further
concluded that US support of the ROK government "need not be
dependent upon the further retention of U.S. occupation
forces in Korea" as long as this support included the
creation of indigenous security forces "capable of serving
effectively as a deterrent to external aggression and a
guarantor of internal order in south Korea," the
implementation of plans for economic assistance, and
continued political support for the ROK "both within and
without the framework of the UN."
The report conceded that the withdrawal of US occupation
forces, "even with the compensatory measures provided
herein," might be followed by a major North Korean effort to
"overthrow the Republic of Korea through direct military
aggression or inspired Insurrection," but observed that
"this risk will obtain equally at any time in the forseeable
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future." If anything, the Army saw the turmoil in South
Korea as a vindication of its position; the shaky Rhee
government was not one upon which it wished to be dependent.
Since it was felt that further postponement of withdrawal
would not reduce the risk but would instead increase the
danger that occupation forces "might be either destroyed or
obliged to abandon Korea in the event of a major hostile
attack," and with the understanding that General MacArthur
supported withdrawal and had certified that it "would not
adversely affect the U.S. position in Japan," NSC 8/2
concluded that withdrawal should be completed by 30 June
1949, the date which Muccio had proposed. It stipulated,
however, that "the U.S. should make it unmistakably clear
that this step in no way constitutes a lessening of U.S.
support of the Government of the Republic of Korea."
Like its predecessor NSC 8, NSC 8/2 was clearly a
compromise document; it tried to reconcile the essentially
incompatible views of the generals and the diplomats. But
in doing so the US was clearly trying to 'have its cake and
eat it too.' Korea was, by compromise, too important to
lose but not important enough to pay to keep. Matray argues
that, as NSC 8/2 so baldly asserted, the final decision to
withdraw occupation forces did not constitute a lessening of
US support for the ROK . In his view, the decision to
withdraw without provision of a military guarantee was not
an abandonment of the ROK, since the policy of containment
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by economic and political means being pursued in Korea did
not require a military commitment "any more than it did in
Greece and Turkey." 161 The difference, of course, was that
the obvious American interest in Greece and Turkey implied a
situational commitment which obviated the necessity of a
formalized nonsi tuat ional commitment. This did not apply in
the case of Korea. In the absence of either type of
security commitment, a substantial US investment in the
development of strong security forces and a sound economy in
the Republic of Korea, factors essential to the political
development of the new republic, would be hard to sell to an
economy-minded Congress. Fuzzy compromises might be
possible In the National Security Council, but in the cold
light of the budgetary process either Korea was important or
it wasn't. Without US support, though, it seemed unlikely
that the ROK would be able to survive, much less evolve into
a showplace of Asian democracy.
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IV. THE DEFENSE PERIMETER
A. THE CONCEPT OF AN ASIAN DEFENSE PERIMETER
The American military withdrawal from Korea, and the
concomitant refusal to make a firm commitment to the defense
of the Republic of Korea, were not isolated events, but were
merely a part, and not a major part at that, of America's
entire approach in Asia at this time. It will be recalled
that the Yalta system was predicated on the existence of a
strong, independent and friendly China which would protect
US Interests on the Asian mainland and contain Soviet
expansionism in Asia. As the fortunes of the Nationalists
in the Chinese civil war declined, however, it became
increasingly and painfully clear that the dream of a unified
China friendly to the United States would not be realized.
The United States reluctantly concluded that the Nationalist
regime could not be saved by anything less than a full-scale
US intervention in China; this option was firmly rejected.
While the spread of nationalism in Asia required a
primarily non-military response, the debacle in China also
called for a reevaluation of America's strategic position.
Kennan observed, as early as 14 March 1948, that the United
States was "operating without any over-all strategic concept
for the entire western Pacific area." He suggested at that
time that the United States should "endeavor to influence
events on the mainland of Asia in ways favorable to our
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security," but "would not regard any mainland areas as vital
to us." He recommended the establishment of "a U-shaped
U.S. security zone embracing the Aleutians, the Ryukyus, the
former Japanese mandated islands, and . . . Guam," with
Okinawa as its "central and most advanced point." Japan and
the Philippines were to be demilitarized and left outside of
this security zone as neutralized areas. Except for its
treatment of the Phillipines, this formulation was identical
to a proposal made to Kennan by MacArthur less than two
weeks earlier when they met in Tokyo. ^^
The consensus in support of the defense perimeter
concept developed gradually, but it was generally accepted
in Washington by the summer of 1949, when the US occupation
of Korea was finally ended. Curiously, however, this
consensus was the result of a temporary confluence of
interests; the State Department, the military establishment,
and General MacArthur had conflicting Interests, and based




The State Department, reflecting the ideas which had
been developed by Kennan in the Policy Planning Staff, was
pessimistic about the ability of the United States to
influence events in Asia, both because of its understanding
of the problem as emerging nationalism and its belief that
there were limits to the resources which the US could afford
to expend in promoting its national security. It believed,
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however, that events in Asia, in particular the fall of the
Nationalist regime in China, did not pose a serious threat
to the United States. Since the threat was defined as
Russian expansionism, albeit promoted by means of
international communism, US Interests could be safeguarded
by combating Soviet control of its satellites as opposed to
Communist ideology. The United States would be far better
off stepping away from the Asian mainland temporarily than
allying itself, at potentially great cost and with little
anticipated benefit, with so-called 'democratic regimes
which did not even enjoy the support of their own people.
This was, in many ways, the great lesson of the fall of
Chiang in China. Syngman Rhee's government in Seoul was
clearly seen by many analysts as little more than a second
rate replica which would be beset by all the same problems
which had plagued the US relationship with the
National ists. 164
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, by contrast, did not agree
that China should be abandoned; they felt that it was both
possible and desirable for the United States to try to halt
the spread of Communism there. In part this was because
they also disagreed with Kennan's interpretation of the
threat. They believed that the Chinese Communists were
"Moscow inspired" and should therefore be regarded as "tools
of Soviet policy." 165 They supported the defense perimeter
concept despite this, prompted in large part by the
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increasingly stringent limits on the resources at their
disposal, as well as their belief that control of the Asian
mainland, including Korea, would not be vital in the event
of an all-out war with the Soviet Union. 166
MacArthur, who by virtue of his position in Japan had a
significant influence in shaping America's Asia policy, came
to support the defense perimeter from yet another
perspective. He was much more of an Ideologue in his view
of the Communist menace, but he also realized the utter
futility of trying to oppose the Chinese Communists with US
troops, as well as the self-defeating effect of lengthy
military occupations such as those the US was conducting in
Japan and Korea. 167
Thus, while there was a consensus of sorts in support of
the defense perimeter concept, it was a very fragile one.
It rested on a fortuitous confluence of interests which was
unlikely to be maintained as the situation developed. One
of the areas in which this consensus most likely to break
down was Korea. Although Kennan had been ready enough to
write off Korea, this approach was never accepted by other
elements in the State Department, who continued to stress
its symbolic importance in the context of the Cold War.
B. TROOP WITHDRAWAL
While provisions for military and economic assistance to
Korea were pursued, the Army also went about executing the
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other major recommendation of NSC 8/2: final military
withdrawal. In doing this, though, the Defense Department
continued to meet with opposition, both from the State
Department and from the ROK. When the Army requested that
the security classification of the withdrawal operation be
downgraded to facilitate completion by 30 June, the State
Department refused to concur, implying that more military
assistance would have to be supplied to the ROK. The Army
believed that the Koreans were holding out for more,
observing that "President RheCs reluctance to agree to the
30 June date, presumably, is based upon his hope for a
promise of more military aid than the conclusions of NSC 8/2
would provide." Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson
personally wrote to Acheson
,
pointing out that previous
postponements had created "serious logistical and budgetary
problems," and threatening that, in the event of a
continuation of the occupation beyond 30 June, "it will be
necessary for your Department to support such supplemental
appropriations as may be necessary." Acheson, however,
refused to budge, retorting that the withdrawal must be
accomplished with minimum risk to the other US objectives in
Korea. 168
At this juncture, on 27 June 1949, the Army produced a
paper which looked beyond the completion of withdrawal to
consider possible US responses to a North Korean
invasion. 169 Considering the ad hoc nature of the eventual
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US response when the invasion actually occurred, it is
significant that the military was not unprepared for this
eventual i ty
.
The Army felt that the South Korean security forces were
capable of handling any internal disruptions. The main
threat to the ROK , therefore, was a full-scale invasion from
the north. It was believed that such an invasion would be
in concert with the Soviet Union and Communist China,
without whose support the North Koreans were not capable of
"sustained and comprehensive military operations." This
would require some sort of US response.
Five possible courses of action were considered:
implementation of emergency plans for the evacuation of all
US personnel in Korea, presentation of the problem to the
United Nations Security Council, initiation of a police
action under UN auspices to restore law and order and the
boundary at the 38th parallel, reentry of US forces alone at
the request of the ROK, and application of the Truman
Doctrine to Korea. The Army concluded that the first two
options, evacuation and presentation of the problem to the
UN, should be adopted. Direct US military action was
rejected because it would commit the United States to "a
unilateral course of action and responsibility in Korea from
which it so recently has struggled to extricate itself," and
"lead to a long and costly involvement of U.S. forces in an
undeclared war." Interestingly, the Army also rejected the
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application of the Truman Doctrine to Korea, although many
analysts, especially Matray, contend that the US had in fact
been applying the Truman Doctrine in Korea for some time.
The Army, exhibiting an understanding of containment more in
line with Kennan's original concept than with the rhetoric
of the Truman Doctrine, argued that the situation in Korea
was only vaguely comparable to that in Greece and Turkey;
the key difference was Korea's lack of strategic value.
Application of the Truman Doctrine was unwarranted because
this "would require prodigious effort and vast expenditures
far out of proportion to the benefits to be expected."
Finally, the initiation of a police action "with U.N.
sanction," which was of course the actual US response when
the invasion did occur a year later, was also rejected
because it involved "a militarily disproportionate
expenditure of U.S. manpower, resources, and effort at a
time when international relations in Europe are in
precarious balance." It was admitted, though, that if the
US did take the problem to the Security Council, and the
Soviet Union for whatever reason did not exercise its veto,
the way would be clear to initiate "police action measures
and sanctions" if they appeared warranted at that time.
The Joint Chiefs enclosed their comments to the Army
study. Reflecting the disparity between missions and
resources, the JCS flatly rejected any military involvement
in Korea:
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From the strategic viewpoint . . . Korea is of little
strategic value to the United States and . . . any
commitment to United States use of military force in Korea
would be ill-advised and impracticable in view of the
potentialities of the over-all world situation and of our
heavy international obligations compared with our current
mi 1 i tary strength
.
They concurred with the Army that a US military response to
a North Korean invasion, either alone or under UN auspices,
would be "militarily unsound." 170
Two days later, on 29 June 1949, the withdrawal of US
occupation forces from Korea was completed. Only a 500-man
Military Advisory Group was left behind. As far as the Army
was concerned, there was no going back. 171
C. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE
In contrast to the alacrity with which the troop
withdrawal was completed, the United States was not
immediately prepared to provide the assistance needed to
comply with NSC 8/2. The fiscal year 1949 budget request
for Korean rehabilitation called for only *60 million "for
the purchase of raw materials and repair parts;" nothing was
Included for capital construction. 172 Far more than this
would be required if South Korea was to be advanced to the
point where it was able to survive on minimal US aid after
the departure of occupation forces. Such a program had,
however, been proposed by Saltzman in response to a request
for guidance from the Economic Cooperation Administration
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(ECA), which took over responsibility for Korean aid from
the Army as of 1 January 1949.
In a memo dated 7 September 1948 Saltzman recommended a
three-year rehabilitation program totaling $410 million,
with $180 million in the first year. The goal of this
program was to reduce subsequent US costs in Korea to an
estimated $45 million annually (compared to an average of
$100 million per year since 1945). It was not believed that
it would be possible to eliminate US aid entirely; officials
doubted that "south Korea alone can ever become fully
self-supporting." Both ECA and Army concurred with the
State recommendation, though neither believed that Congress
was likely to provide the money. 173
By the time that NSC 8/2 was approved, the ECA had
developed Saltzman's proposal into a multi-year
rehabilitation program for Korea totaling $410 million
through 30 June 1952 (the limit of ECA's legislated
existence), with $192 million of that planned for fiscal
year 1950. The NSC recommended that legislative approval be
sought for this program. 174
NSC 8/2 had also called for military assistance. Up to
this point this had not been a consideration, since southern
Korea was occupied by the US Army. Initial US efforts had
focused on the restoration of internal order; one of the
first acts was the reopenning of the Japanese Police Academy
in Seoul on 15 October 1945. When an Office of the Director
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of National Defense was created a month later, it controlled
not only a new Bureau of Armed Forces, with Army and Navy
Departments, but the Bureau of Police as well; the first
Director, Brigadier General Lawrence E. Schick, was Hodge's
Provost Marshal General. 175
Nevertheless, American advisors had taken some positive
steps. An English language school opened on 5 December
1945, at the Methodist Theological Seminary in Seoul, to
provide instruction to officer candidates, and recruitment
began on 14 January 1946 for "a constabulary-type police
reserve." By April 1946 there were, in addition to a
regiment at Seoul, seven more regiments in the outlying
provinces. Another important step was taken when the police
function was removed by the creation of a separate National
Police on 29 March 1946, but what little progress this
represented toward the creation of a real army was more then
negated when the Department of National Defense was
redesignated the Department of Internal Security on 15 June
1946; the Bureau of Armed Forces was abol ished, and the Army
and Navy Departments were redesignated Bureaus of
Constabulary and Coast Guard. 176
American control of the Constabulary officially ended in
September 1946, with the Americans technically assuming
positions as advisors, but these 'advisors' in reality
retained much of the control they had previously exercised.
The American influence was limited far more by lack of
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personnel, with the number of advisors for the whole
Constabulary averaging only six for the entire period from
September 1946 to April 1948, and by the restriction of
training to use of small arms, basic drill, and "methods of
internal security." 177
A major result of this lack of attention on the part of
American occupation authorities was a corresponding premium
placed on military experience obtained elsewhere, which in
effect meant with either the Chinese or Japanese. In a
classic Korean pattern, the military split into factions
along these lines, with the factions being further
subdivided into friendhsip groups based on factors such as
family ties, place of origin, and educational background.
These factions competed with each other for Influence and
access to resources. 178 On top of these factional
struggles, the military became caught up in the chaotic
political infighting which marked the larger society at this
poi nt . 179
Both of these contests were settled when Syngman Rhee
became President of the ROK . The Chinese faction in the
military, which had initially been dominant, was supplanted
by the Japanese faction when Rhee passed over several more
senior members of the former group and appointed Lee
Ung-jin, who had served with the Japanese, as the first Army
Chief of Staff. This move was intended to assure Rhee of
the loyalty of the military "by installing young and more
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malleable officers in the key posts." The influence of the
China faction was all but eliminated with the assassination
of Kim Koo, Rhee's principal rival and their chief
supporter. Both the factional struggling and the
pol 1 t ic izat ion of the military by Rhee undermined efforts to
create an effective fighting force. This problem was
exacerbated by the extensive ant i -Communist purge which
followed the Yosu rebellion of October 1948, which seriously
weakened the fledgling military apparatus. 180
With the impending withdrawal of US forces, however, it
became necessary to develop indigenous forces which would
enable the Koreans to maintain internal security and control
their borders. On 10 March 1948 the JCS had authorized the
Constabulary to be augmented to a force of 50,000 men and
equipped with small arms, cannon up to 105-mm., and armored
vehicles "as deemed appropriate." As US troops began to
leave Korea during late 1948 and early 1949, they turned
over their equipment to these Korean forces; this consisted
mostly, however, of small arms and light machine guns. 181
By the time NSC 8/2 was prepared, the Republic of Korea
had 65,000 men in its army, of whom 50,000 were equipped
"with U.S. infantry type materiel." There were also 45,000
police and 4000 men in a Coast Guard. Although the Koreans
wanted an air force, the US had provided only "twelve
observation type aircraft." The NSC recommended that
legislative authorization be sought for military assistance
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to slightly augment these forces, the ultimate goal being "a
wel
1
-tral ned and -equipped Army of 65,000 men, including air
detachments, suitable for maintaining internal order under
conditions of political strife and inspired disorder and for
maintaining border security," as well as a 4000 man Coast
Guard and a 35,000 man police force. 182 Washington was
careful not to give the ROK an offensive capability because
of its very legitimate concern over the desires of Rhee to
reunite the peninsula by force. 183
The recommendations of NSC 8/2 were implemented by two
pieces of legislation which the administration sent to
Congress in the summer of 1949. Truman sent a message to
Congress on 7 June 1949 requesting S150 million for economic
assistance to Korea - the Korean Aid Act of 1949. He
pointed out that Korea up to that point had been receiving
only basic relief - enough for subsistence but not for any
economic progress toward self-sufficiency. Without
continued US aid the ROK economy "would collapse -
inevitably and rapidly." But Truman wanted more than
continued relief; he was asking Congress for a plan that
would lead to economic recovery. 184
The next day, Acting Secretary of State Webb appeared
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to support the
request for Korean aid. He called the bill "among the most
important which the Department of State is supporting at
this session of Congress." Webb also explicitly linked
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economic and military power in Korea: "a sound economy is
the basis of military as well as political strength. The
Korean Government cannot maintain a force able to insure
internal order without a viable economy." 185
The package was completed on 25 July 1949 when the
administration submitted to Congress the Mutual Defense
Appropriations Program (MDAP), which included military
aslstance for the ROK. The avowed goal of this assistance
was to give the ROK "forces adequate to protect itself
against internal disturbances and external attacks short of
an aggressive war supported by a major power." 18^
The initiative now passed to Congress. Truman expected
trouble. As Matray points out,
The failure of the Republican party to capture the
presidency in 1948 had erased the last remnants of
bipartisanship in foreign affairs. The Truman
administration recognized from the outset that it would
obtain congressional approval for the Korean aid package
only with considerable difficulty. 187
The request for aid to Korea also furnished the Republicans
with an opportunity to criticize the administration for the
Moss 7 of China. As the Committee itself noted in its
Historical Series,
The task of the admi n i strat ion's witnesses before the
committee was difficult. On the one hand, they had to
convince the committee of the importance of the survival
of South Korea to U.S. interests in the Far East. Yet,
they had to admit that strategically and militarily South
Korea was of little significance. Since the
administration could present no direct link between the
security of the United States and the maintenance of the
Republic of Korea, the witnesses stressed the
psychological impact and the "loss of prestige" that would
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result from the withdrawal of American aid and a Communist
takeover of the South. Ultimately, however, the
administration wished to place the responsibility for the
future of Korea on the Koreans themselves. 188
The State Department pushed aid to Korea; the Army did
as well, since failure to secure aid might have jeopardized
the recently achieved troop withdrawal. In fact, William
Stueck contends that the Army deliberately exaggerated the
military strength of the ROK in testimony to Congress in
order to achieve the dual goals of troop withdrawal and
substantial US economic and military assistance. 189
Certainly all the players in the bureaucracy, both Army and
State Department, had a vested interest in executing the
compromise program outlined in NSC 8/2. But they had to
overcome opposition in Congress in order to acquire the
necessary funding. The hearings conducted by the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs are therefore significant both
as a summation of the administration's Korea policy and as a
critique of that policy by some members of Congress, most
prominently Republican Congressman Walter H. Judd of
Minnesota, a leading critic of the Truman administration's
Chi na pol i cy .
Drawing a clear parallel between Korea and China, Judd
excoriated the request for aid as "just a sop, to try and
cover our retreat, so it does not expose publicly that we
are letting our allies down, after all our promises." At
another point he called the program "a $150 million coverup
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for our inability or decision not to take action to carry
out a promise we made to the Koreans. It is an attempt to
make look respectable a policy that is not respectable, from
the standpoint of a commitment of the United States." He
also criticized the compromise nature of the program,
entailing as it did limited aid without a military
commitment, as "half fish half foul." Judd foresaw only
disastrous consequences from this sort of policy. On the
one hand, it would give the South Koreans an exaggerated
opinion of the actual strength of the US commitment; he
believed that "it would be better to tell them they are on
their own and let them make their own terms with the enemy,
instead of giving them the impression we are going to help
if we do not Intend to." On the other hand, if the United
States was not going to do what was necessary to save South
Korea from communism, and was going to abandon it sooner or
later, whatever resources were put into the ROK in the
interim would be wasted. He ultimately saw the proposed aid
program as "an attempt to make the Koreans and the world
think we are carrying out a commitment, when we know the
odds are overwhelming against us." 190
The administration's witnesses were thus forced to
defend the decision to withdraw US forces, a move which the
bill's opponents believed was critically undercutting the
very objectives in Korea for which the aid was purportedly
being requested. Kennan, then still head of the Policy
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Planning Staff, observed that the US forces in Korea were
not strong enough to resist North Korean forces, and were
therefore not a "serious deterrent" against an attack from
the north. Neither were they strong enough to "police South
Korea," a role considered more likely since the main threat
was felt to be communist infiltration of South Korea. The
future therefore depended on the success of the Republic of
Korea in maintaining order, providing an effective deterrent
against invasion, and meeting the needs of the people to
minimize internal disruption. If the ROK was successful, US
forces would be redundant. If the ROK failed, the US forces
could not effect the outcome, and would simply be caught up
in the maelstrom, the outcome the Army had feared all along.
As Kennan pointed out, "there is no worse position for our
troops than to find themselves suddenly engulfed in a sea of
adverse political sentiment." He concluded that he would
"feel happy when we are out of that exposed position in a
military sense." 191
Acheson conceded that the loss of Korea to the
communists would adversely effect US security, "because they
get that much closer to Japan and because they cause that
much more trouble." But Kennan disputed the contention that
the US troop withdrawal would have an adverse psychological
impact
:
I do not think the psychological repurcussions will be
very great in the Far East, because it is my impression
. . . that this action of ours in removing them has
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already been extensively discounted all over that area.
People have known that it was our plan over the last year,
they know the United Nations calls upon us to do it and
they know we are planning to do it.
Finally, he argued against US military intervention in South
Korea even if the ROK was unable to hold, calling this
"really the vital point." 192
The Army was represented by MG Charles L. Bolte and BG
Thomas S. Timberman, who reiterated the standard Army
arguments against the retention of forces. Timberman
emphasized the lack of military utility of the US position
in Korea, pointing out that the peninsula could be "handled
better by our air forces and our sea forces ... as opposed
to troops actually on the ground in an untenable position,"
and that "any reentry on the continent would bypass and not
use Korea." Bolte also expressed the Army's desire to avoid
becoming embroiled in fighting in Korea in the event of a
North Korean invasion, commenting that "we certainly would
not want our tactical units involved in combat on the Korean
pen 1 nsu la." 193
Despite the administration's effort, the House, in
January 1950, defeated its version of the Korean aid bill
192-191, with Republicans opposing it by a margin of six to
one. Coming on the heels of the US troop withdrawal, the
defeat of the aid bill shocked Syngman Rhee. 194 Acheson
later told the House that it created a "great many worries
and doubts" in Korea. 195
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The administration's request for aid to Korea was
reincarnated as the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of
1950 only by the addition of aid for Formosa, and the
reduction of aid for Korea from $150 million to $60 million;
Congressman Donald Jackson wryly observed that the new bill
"resembles the original Korean Aid Act about as much as
Forever Amber resembles Mother Goose." 19^ It passed on 14
February 1950, authorizing appropor i at ion of $60 million in
aid for Korea for the remainder of fiscal year 1950; this
was soon amended, on 5 June 1950, to add an extra $100
million for fiscal year 1951. 197 In terms of the
credibility of the purported US commitment, however, the
damage had already been done. It was abundantly clear that,
while the United States desired to see the establishment of
a viable, democratic republic in Korea, it was not willing
to do very much by way of commitment of resources to promote
this outcome. Acheson himself stated the administration's
curiously nuanced position on Korea while testifying in
support of the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act, arguing
that "we have responsibilities but no commitments." 198
This impression was only reinforced by the composition
of military assistance provided. After the final withdrawal
of US forces, some additional equipment was turned over to
the ROK , but it consisted "principally of such items as
carbines, howitzers, rifles, machine guns, mortars, trucks,
and 20 liaison-type airplanes . . . helmets, boots,
100
blankets, cartridge belts, and tents." 199 This resulted in
the achievement of the NSC 8/2 goal of equipping a 65,000
man force with US equipment, but it did not answer the needs
of the ROK forces for fighter aircraft or heavier ground
equ i pment
.
In fact, the United States did not intend to meet these
requests. The planned military assistance program was
"mainly in the form of maintenance materials and spare parts
to supplement the military equipment turned over under the
Surplus Property Act." 200 The US Air Force opposed requests
by the ROK for F-51 fighters, which were supported by
Ambassador to Korea Muccio, despite the fact that the Far
East Air Force (FEAF) in Japan was "junking" surplus
fighters, including F-51s. The Air Force interpreted the
terminology in NSC 8/2 to refer to "liaison aircraft only,"
but, more fundamentally, objected to the whole idea of
military assistance to Korea. As late as 10 May 1950, it
maintained that "there is no military justification for
military assistance to Korea." 201 The Army, for its part,
deliberately withheld tanks, 155-mm. howitzers and other
heavy equipment; it maintained that Korean roads and bridges
would not support such heavy items, but was mostly concerned
that "the Republic of Korea would embark upon military
adventures of its own into North Korea if it had
"offensive-type" equipment." 202 This was a very real
concern, based upon Rhee's frequent public declarations
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calling for reunification at any price. 203 Clearly, though,
the decision was made very much on the side of caution,
indicating the relatively low weight given to the security
of South Korea in determining the proper balance.
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs, clarified the US position during hearings on the
1950 Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Speaking on 20 June
1950, only five days before the North Korean attack, he
argued that the South Koreans
cannot expect to establish in South Korea, an army, or
armed forces which would be able to meet an organized
major invasion from the North but we think that they can
get themselves up as a going concern if they can take care
of everything short of that. Our goal here is to assist
the South Koreans to establish a security force which can
deal with domestic disorders, armed bands coming across
the 38th parallel, and force the opposition to make the
choice to fight a major war as the price for taking over
southern Korea. We see no present indication that the
people across the border have any intention of fighting a
major war for that purpose. 204
The pattern of relative neglect persisted when
assistance under MDAP was actually provided. On 25 October
1949 Congress appropriated $27,640,000 for military
assistance to Iran, Korea and the Philippines. A required
implementing agreement with the ROK was signed on 26 January
1950, and a program for Korea totaling $10,970,000 was
agreed upon on 15 March 1950. By the time of the North
Korean invasion in June, however, only a trickle had
actually reached Korea, because the decision had been made,
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"in view of the status of equipment of the Armed Forces in
1950," to supply this assistance from new procurement .205
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V. KOREA IN AMERICA'S ASIA POLICY
A. THE MODERATE APPROACH
On 1 October 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed the creation of
the People's Republic of China. The victory of the Chinese
Communists, coupled with the discovery that the Soviet Union
had successfully tested a nuclear weapon the month before,
clearly necessitated a new policy, not only towards China
but towards Asia as a whole. The State Department advanced
such a comprehensive policy in November 1949 in the form of
an outline prepared for review with the President . 206
The most striking aspect of this outline was its
continuity with previous thinking on the nature of the
Soviet threat and the appropriate US response in Asia.
Significantly, the fundamental problem was defined as "a
deep-seated revolutionary movement, composed on the one hand
of a nationalist revolt against colonial imperialism and on
the other hand discontent with existing economic and social
conditions." It was recognized that this revolutionary
movement had been "captured by the Communists," especially
in China and Indochina, and was being used as "the tool of
traditional Russian imperialism," but, while the goal of the
United States was clearly to halt the spread of Soviet
control and influence, the nature of the movement dictated a
US response "principally by means other than arms."
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The State Department outline indicated that US strategic
Interests in Asia were under review, but the general
understanding was that they were based "in the first
instance on the off-shore islands, i.e. Japan, Okinawa, and
the Philippines," the so-called defense perimeter, and
therefore the US position was "not directly jeopardized by
the loss of China."
To further America's political and strategic interests
in Asia, then, the outline recommended that ties with China
be maintained through trade and America's "historic
association with the Chinese people," and that the United
States recognize Communist China "when it controls
substantially all the territory of China and when it
indicates willingness to meet its international
obligations." In place of China, Japan was to be restored;
the outline recommended conclusion of a peace treaty, with
or without the Soviet Union, which would not prevent
retention of US bases in Japan nor preclude future bilateral
defense cooperation. As for Korea, its importance remained
political, "as a yardstick of US ability to cope with Asian
probl ems.
"
Kennan's influence is clearly discernible. Indeed, in
the aftermath of these two seemingly cataclysmic events he
stood out by maintaining that nothing had really changed.
In a February 1950 draft memo he argued that the fal 1 of
China was merely "the culmination of processes which have
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long been apparent," and that US policy had both anticipated
and allowed for this development. He further claimed that
the acquisition by the Soviet Union of an atomic capability
also added "no new fundamental element" to the situation.
The US had predicted that the Russians would eventually
develop an atomic bomb. The fact that they had done it far
earlier than even the most pessimistic projections predicted
was, in Kennan's view, "of no fundamental significance."
Since nothing had occurred to alter the assumptions on which
US policy was based, Kennan believed that there was no real
reason for concern, and that the perception of a crisis in
the Cold War was "largely of our own making." 207
While Kennan was not unduly concerned by these
developments, however, others did not share his equinimity.
The fragile consensus which had developed around the defense
perimeter concept began to unravel. There was a fundamental
disagreement over the nature of the threat to American
security from Asian communism. The new Secretary of
Defense, Louis Johnson, did not approve of the State
Department approach in China, and called for a reassessment
of US policy in the region. To a large extent this
resurgence of interest on the part of the military was
stimulated by the appropriation, under Section 303 of the
MDAP, of $75 million to be used to contain communism in and
around China. While the Defense Department was eager to
liquidate its involvement in Korea, it had always been
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interested in Taiwan as a strategic asset, but was prevented
from doing much about i t by a lack of resources; Section 303
offered a potential source of funding. The State
Department, however, had different plans for the money, and
at any rate insisted that the United States refrain from any
involvement with Taiwan as a prerequisite for its policy of
promoting Chinese nationalist sentiment and thereby
encouraging a "Titoist" rift between the Russians and the
Chinese communists. The reassessment which Johnson had
commissioned was an attempt to reverse this moderate policy
advocated by the State Department as a precursor to a more
aggressive Taiwan policy. Indeed, the draft report, NSC 48,
challenged the assumption that a split between Communist
regimes in Peking and Moscow was likely or even desirable,
and instead urged a more forceful effort to aid the 'forces
of freedom' which were combating communism in the region.
The State Department, however, was able to successfully
change this draft, so that the final report, NSC 48/1,




The State Department outline thus formed the basis of
the conclusions and recommendations, which were adopted on
30 December 1949 as NSC 48/2.209 In essence, NSC 48/2
indicated that the United States should do what it could to
improve the situation in Asia, but avoid becoming so
identified with the effort that it would be responsible if
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things didn't work out. The proposed US role was
essentially passive, acting more as a facilitator than a
leader. Regional associations of non-Communist Asian states
would be encouraged, but they had to be "the result of a
genuine desire on the part of the participating nations to
cooperate for mutual benefit in solving the political,
economic, social and cultural problems of the area;" the
United States could not "take such an active part in the
early stages of the formation of such an association that it
will be subject to the charge of using Asiatic nations to
further United States ambitions." The US "should encourage
the creation of an atmosphere favorable to economic recovery
and developoment in non-Communist Asia, and to the revival
of trade along multilateral, non-discriminatory lines," but
"should carefully avoid assuming responsibility for the
economic welfare and development" of Asia.
Recognizing nationalism as the dominant political force
in Asia, the study called upon the United States to
"continue to use its influence in Asia toward resolving the
col on i al -nat i onal i st conflict in such a way as to satisfy
the fundamental demands of the nationalist movement," but,
since the colonialists in Asia were America's allies in
Europe, this had somehow to be accomplished while




The power of nationalism also formed the basis for the
policy toward China, under which the US would "exploit,
through appropriate political, psychological and economic
means, any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR
and between the Stalinists and other elements in China,
while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention."
But recognition of the Chinese Communist regime was to be
avoided "until it is clearly in the United States interest
to do so," and the US would communicate to friendly
governments its views on "the dangers of hasty recognition,"
although it would "not take a stand which would engage the
prestige of the United States in an attempt to prevent such
recogn i t ion .
"
At the same time, however, basic US security objectives
in Asia included the "reduction and eventual elimination of
the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia,"
and prevention of actions by any other nation or alliance
which would "threaten the security of the United States
. . . or the peace, national independence and stability of
the Asiatic nations," a clear reference to the newly created
People's Republic of China. In pursuit of these objectives,
the US would, in selected nations, promote the development
of "sufficient military power ... to maintain internal
security and to prevent further encroachment by communism."
This was clearly the US policy in Korea; NSC 48/2 called for
"the extension of political support and economic, technical,
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military and other assistance to the democratically-elected
Government of the Republic of Korea" under the ECA , MDAP and
USIE (U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Program).
It should be immediately obvious that NSC 48/2 was
loaded with fundamental contradictions and inconsistencies,
reflecting the origin of the document as well as the schism
in Washington over the proper response to events in China;
the policies it advocated were a clear case of trying to
'have your cake and eat it too'. Asian nationalist goals
were to be met, but not at the expense of the European
allies. The non-Communist nations in Asia were to be
encouraged to assume responsibility for their own future,
with the US playing the limited role of a facilitator, but
the success or failure of their efforts impinged directly on
basic US security objectives; the US was already involved,
and would continue to be involved, in nations such as Korea
which were politically important but not judged significant
enough strategically to justify a defense commitment. The
US would try to encourage a rift between Peking and Moscow,
as well as undermine the Communist regime in China, but
would also somehow avoid the appearance of intervention. It
would hold back on recognition of the Communist regime, but
not become identified with opposition to recognition.
The contradictory nature of America's Asia policy was
nowhere more apparent than in the gap between its political
and military aspects. The defense perimeter concept implied
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that the Asian mainland, to include countries on the
Communist periphery like Korea, was ultimately expendable.
While the US would not simply abandon these areas,
competition with the Soviets was limited to the political
and economic arenas. A corollary to this was the perception
of Soviet expansionism, as opposed to communism per se , as
the major threat to US security.
This was a viable approach as long as the Soviets also
adopted the same limits; this was a key assumption upon
which the entire strategy was erected. The strategy of
containment was based on the belief that Moscow would not
employ overt military means to further its expansionist
aims. 210 Military planning concentrated on preparation for
a global conflict with the Soviet Union; as Gaddis notes,
"the dominant context affecting Washington's strategic
thinking in late 1949 and early 1950 was a preoccupation
with general war, centered in Europe, in which the Soviet
Union would be the main adversary." It was in this context





This understanding of the nature of the Cold War in Asia
led Washington to believe that it could achieve peace and
stability, not only in Korea but elsewhere in Asia, while
avoiding the difficult issue of military guarantees for
nations which were not strategically vital to the US. 212
But Alexander George and Richard Smoke, In their classic
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study of deterrence, argue that this preoccupation with
general war caused "a major gap in American strategic
thinking and foreign policy planning" which led to the lack
of a military commitment to the ROK. This gap "sprang from
the failure to envisage that considerations other than
Korea's strategic importance in a general war might require
a U.S. commitment to its defense." 213
It would be unfair, however, to suggest that the point
was somehow overlooked by planners in Washington. The
Army's analysis of possible US responses in the event of a
North Korean invasion indicates that the issue had been
considered and, at least so far as the military was
concerned, resolved: Korea, in any context, was not worth
fighting for. But, of course, the State Department did not
agree; it still felt that the political consequences of a
communist victory were unacceptable. This dichotomy,
"between geopolitical assert i veness on the part of the State
Department and strategic caution on that of the military,"
reflected the basic contradiction in American foreign policy
between the desire to get tough with the Russians and the
insistence on balanced budgets and decreased military
spending. 214 As long as the Soviets eschewed military
action, these two viewpoints could coexist, albeit
uncomfortably. But there was indeed a major gap, the same
one which had characterized America's policy in Korea since
the beginning, the gap between a situational versus a
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nonsi tuat i onal approach to US commitments on the Asian
mainl and.
Despite these difficulties, though, the moderate State
Department approach continued to hold. On 5 January 1950
Truman affirmed that the US had "no predatory designs on
Formosa or on any other Chinese territory," nor did it
"desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to
establish military bases on Formosa at this time." The US
would avoid any involvement in the Chinese civil war: not
only would armed forces not be used, but the US would "not
provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on
Formosa." Acheson, in separate extemporaneous remarks,
amplified this last point, explaining that the reason the
Nationalist forces lost was not lack of resources, but lack
of will, and that "it is not the function of the United
States nor will it or can it attempt to furnish a wi 1 1 to
resist and a purpose for resistance to those who must
provide for themselves." 215
A week later, Acheson made his famous speech to the
National Press Club in which he examined America's Asian
policy. 216 The themes which he developed in this speech
were the same ones contained in the State Department outline
and NSC 48/2, and reflected Kennan's assumptions about the
nature of the problem in Asia. Acheson explained that there
was "a developing Asian consciousness" based on "a revulsion
against the acceptance of misery and poverty as the normal
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conditions of life" as well as a "revulsion against foreign
domination." The symbol of this emerging consciousness was
nationalism: this, rather than communism, was the "basic
revolutionary force" in Asia. Applying this reasoning to
the situation in China, he maintained that the US "must not
undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the
righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the
Chinese people which must develop." The United States, of
course, opposed communism, both as a doctrine inimical to
everything for which America stood and as "the spearhead of
Russian imperialism," but Acheson emphasized that the
purpose of US policy in Asia was not merely to oppose
communism. Instead, the US sought to assist the peoples of
Asia in their own development,
not as a mere negative reaction to communism but as the
most positive affirmation of the most affirmative truth
that we hold, which is in the dignity and right of every
nation, of every people, and of every individual to
develop in their own way, making their own mistakes,
reaching their own triumphs but acting under their own
responsibi 1 i ty .
"
The inevitable corollary to this position, however, was that
American assistance could be effective only when it was
accompanied by a desire and an ability on the part of those
being assisted to achieve results.
This approach formed the basis of US assistance to
Korea, which Acheson believed should be continued. He
characterized the idea "that we should stop half way through
the achievement of the establishment" of the ROK as "the
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most utter defeatism and utter madness". Nevertheless, in
what was destined to become the most famous section of this
speech, he outlined the defensive perimeter in Asia, which
of course excluded South Korea, concluding that it was
impossible to guarantee those areas outside of the perimeter
against military attack. If such an attack did occur,
the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to
resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire
civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations
which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any
people who are determined to protect their independence
against outside aggression.
B. AGONIZING REAPPRAISAL
Despite these pronouncements, however, the Truman
administration became increasingly alienated from Kennan's
approach to containment as 1949 turned into 1950. In some
respects this was a response to concrete deve 1 opments--the
fall of China and the testing of an atomic device by the
Soviet Union, which struck Washington "like a series of
hammer blows"--but more fundamentally these events merely
applied pressure to a fissure which had always existed. 21 '
Kennan's differentiation between vital and peripheral
interests had led to the development of the defense
perimeter concept, which was predicated on the denial of key
island strongpoints to the Soviets. This was basically an
asymmetrical response to the Soviet threat, responding in an
area of American strength. This implied, however, a
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necessary toleration of instances in which Soviet strength
would be applied against American weaknesses. Kennan, of
course, believed that this was quite possible so long as the
vital power centers were safeguarded, but this view had
never been wholeheartedly endorsed, the running battle over
Korean withdrawal being a good example. Neither Truman nor
Acheson could necessarily take the long historical view of
Kennan; they had to contend with the very immediate reality
of domestic politics and relations with allies. The success
of the Communist revolution in China and the Soviet
acquisition of atomic weapons created the perception of a
gain for the Russians which in turn affected views of the
momentum and likely outcome of the Cold War. Kennan
emphasized Soviet intentions, but the administration
increasingly felt compelled to base its calculations on
capabilities, given the high stakes involved and the
uncertainty of any estimate of intentions. 218
There was also a change in the administration's
willingness to distinguish between communist regimes. NSC
48/2 supported the policy of encouraging Titoism, using the
force of nationalism to limit, and even decrease, Soviet
influence. But, at the same time, the rhetoric of the Cold
War was being couched more and more in terms of an
implacable conflict between hostile ideologies. This view
became much harder to resist following the conclusion of the
Sino-Soviet Treaty in February 1950. This development also
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put increased pressure on the State Department policy of
non-intervention in Taiwan; the military had reluctantly
gone along with a policy that would lead to the occupation
of the island by weak Chinese Communist forces, but it was
much less willing to accept a policy which might lead to a
Soviet military presence. 219
This shift was accompanied by a growing alienation
between Kennan and Acheson . The thinking of both evolved
significantly during this period, but in opposite
directions. Kennan became more convinced than ever that
there was too much emphasis on the military aspect of the
Soviet threat, and, in marked contrast to his earlier
contentions, now claimed that it might be possible to
negotiate with the Russians. Acheson, on the other hand,
now distrusted the Kremlin almost completely. As a result
of this growing gulf in perspective, Kennan's advice became
increasingly unpalatable to Acheson. Kennan even began to
drift away from the other members of his own Policy Planning
Staff. Acheson, who had never been a strong supporter of
the PPS anyway--it was, after all, Marshall's creation and a
r e f 1 ec 1 1 on of h l a approach t o dec 1 s 1 onmak ing— finally t ook
the step, in mid-September 1949, of withdrawing the direct
access to his office which was one of the cornerstones of
the influence and power of the PPS. Kennan responded, in
short order, by requesting that he be relieved as head of
the PPS and allowed to take a leave of absence from the
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State Department. In November, Acheson decided to replace
Kennan with his deputy, Paul Nitze, who's views on the
Soviet threat and the correct way in which to respond to it
were soon to emerge as almost diametrically opposed to those
espoused by his former chief. Kennan's views continued to
be influential, particularly in the area of Far Eastern
policy, as is clear from NSC 48/2, the administration's
Taiwan policy pronouncement, and Acheson's Press Club
speech, all of which occurred after Kennan's fall from
grace. But, when those policies began to be attacked, and
the assumptions on which they were based strongly
challenged, Kennan was no longer in a position to seriously
defend his views. 220
In early 1950, the attack on the admi n i strat i on's policy
went into high gear. The critics of Truman's China policy
were joined by those who blamed the loss of China, and most
of the other problems faced by the United States in the
world, on the influence of Communists in the State
Department. Their offensive, which Acheson with
characteristic patrician disdain termed the "attack of the
primitives," began in earnest with Senator Joseph McCarthy's
speech in Wheeling, West Virginia on 9 February 1950. 221
McCarthyism had the unhappy effect of essentially ending any
rational debate of the administration's foreign policy, as
well as weakening the position of supporters of a moderate
approach to China. 222
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A new, countervailing strategy began to emerge in late
1949 and early 1950, one which has been termed Asian rim
containment. Predicated on the belief that Communist China
was a Soviet satellite and a base for futher Soviet
expansion in Asia, it advocated US involvement on the Asian
mainland by means of military and economic assistance, in
effect establishing a political and psychological arc of
containment on the Asian periphery while the more formal
military defense perimeter remained tied to the chain of
islands offshore. This strategy did not emerge full-blown,
nor was it in fact anything particularly new, since a
minority had been advocating a similar approach for years.
The Defense Department had already begun to break with State
over the issue of Taiwan. It was, rather, "a syndrome of
discrete decisions linked by a new disposition." It picked
up support until it came to dominate US policy. 223
This shift in approach to the problem of dealing with
the Soviet Union began to invalidate the US policy toward
Korea in subtle ways. The policy itself held firm, as was
evidenced by public pronouncements such as Acheson's Press
Club speech, as well as internal documents such as NSC 48/2.
But the underlying assumptions upon which the policy had
been erected were increasingly challenged. It appeared that
the old remedies— economic aid and limited security
assi stance--wou 1 d no longer suffice to counter a new and
significantly enhanced threat. 224 America / s Korea policy
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was becoming obsolete, although no one seemed to realize it
at the time. 225
Against this background, the administration conducted a
thorough reassessment, under the leadership of Paul Nitze,
of America's Soviet policy. The result, NSC 68, represented




A. A SHIFT OF ASSUMPTIONS
On 31 January 1950 Truman instructed the Secretaries of
State and Defense
to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace
and war and of the effect of these objectives on our
strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb
capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of
the Soviet Union. 226
A special ad hoc working group was formed under Nitze to
conduct this study. This group took advantage of the broad
terms of their instructions to conduct a thorough review of
American foreign policy. Their product, NSC 68, was a major
departure in several significant ways.
Nitze believed that the Soviets, having broken America's
atomic monoploy, were now willing to take greater risks in
pursuit of their objectives. In February 1950 he contended
that "recent Soviet moves reflect not only a mounting
militancy but suggest a boldness that is essentially new -
and borders on recklessness." Unlike Kennan, he did not
believe that the Soviets would stop short of the use of
force, particularly in local areas. 227 This situation,
combined with the relative weakness of conventional US
forces, created a situation fraught with danger.
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NSC 68 argued that, in such a context, containment was
no longer a realistic or adequate policy. If it was not
backed up by adequate military strength, containment was no
more than "a policy of bluff. "228 More fundamentally,
though, the whole containment approach was threatened by the
acquisition by the Soviet Union of the atomic bomb: "In a
shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic
warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to check the
Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is
becoming less and less tol erabl e . "229
In sharp contrast to Kennan, who had argued that it was
only necessary to hold certain points which were vital by
virtue of their mi 1 i tary- i ndustr i al potential, NSC 68 argued
that all areas not already dominated by the Soviet Union
were important and had to be held if the US was to avoid an
inevitable slide to the very brink of destruction. It
suggested that the Soviet Union would nibble away at the
periphery of the free world by "piecemeal aggression,"
attacking areas like Korea which were not vital to US
interests. Lacking adequate conventional forces to respond
in kind, and unwilling to use atomic weapons in the defense
of low priority interests, particularly when threatened with
the possibility of a Soviet atomic response, the US would
have no choice but to stand by and watch while Communism
expanded inexorably. This would cause the US to appear
"alternately irresolute and desperate," and lead the other
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nations of the world, seeing no hope for the future, to
"drift into a course of neutrality eventually leading to
Soviet domination." 230 The US, for its part, would have to
withdraw gradually in the face of the Kremlin's onslaught,
"until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions
of vital interest." 231 Based on this scenario, NSC 68
maintained that "a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a
defeat everywhere." 232 Finally, because of the losses which
the free world had already sustained, most recently and most
notably in China, "any substantial further extension of the
area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the
possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the
Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled." 233
The United States had up to this point responded to the
fundamental problem of matching resources and commitments by
limiting commitments as much as possible, and beyond that
hoping for the best. NSC 68 argued forcefully that this was
no longer adequate in a world in which America's implacable
foe, the Soviet Union, had an atomic capability. Instead,
it recommended that the United States drastically increase
military spending to bring strength into line with
commitments, calling this "the only course which is
consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental
purpose." It rejected the conventional wisdom that defense
spending could not exceed $15 billion without causing
destructive inflation, pointing out that World War II had
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demonstrated "that the American economy, when it operates at
a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous
resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while
simultaneously providing a high standard of living." 234
Though they did not say so in their study, the authors of
NSC 68 were contemplating defense expenditures on the order
of $35-50 billion per year for several years, until the US
achieved the requisite level of military strength. 235
The rationale which supported this conclusion, however,
expanded interests as well as means, and at a much more
rapid pace. It effectively invalidated Kennan's distinction
between vital and peripheral interests, thereby making all
points of contention with the Soviet Union vital to American
security. It also vastly increased the importance of
perceptions, and placed a premium on the acquisition and
retention of allies. 236 Because any expansion of communism
was interpreted as a victory for the Soviet Union, and since
any victory by the Soviet Union was de facto a defeat for
the United States, and since any further defeats would lead
inexorably to a final apocalyptic confrontation on terms
vastly unfavorable to the United States, it was clearly
vital to America to successfully counter whatever move the
Soviets might make next, wherever it happened to be.
This was particularly true in Asia, where the Truman
administration had, according to its critics, abandoned
China to the Communists. John Foster Dulles, writing in May
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of 1950, explained that, while the loss of China clearly
marked a shift in the balance of power in the favor of the
Soviet Union, the extent of this shift would be measured by
the US response to the next Soviet move. He argued that, if
American actions indicated "a continuing disposition to fall
back and allow doubtful areas to fall under Soviet Communist
control," US influence would deteriorate in all these
peripheral areas, from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. 23
"''
Nitze later pointed out that US policy on Taiwan and Korea
did not change after NSC 68, but the ideas in NSC 68
contained the seeds of the rationale which later justified
US intervention in the Korean War. 238 Not surprisingly,
they were virtually the same ideas which the State
Department had been using for years to support its case for
a US military presence in Korea; in effect, a nonsi tuat i onal
approach to commitments.
B. THE KOREAN INTERVENTION
On 25 June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea. It
quickly became apparent that South Korean forces would not
be able to successfully resist the attack. The United
States, despite having placed Korea outside of the defense
perimeter, despite having withdrawn ground forces only a
year earlier, despite its clear decision not to become
involved militarily on the Korean peninsula, soon committed
US forces to the Korean War. Why? In particular, did this
decision represent a reassessment of the strategic
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importance of Korea to the United States? The answer, as
with so many things, is both yes and no. The United States
did not revise its thinking on Korea so much as it revised
its thinking on the meaning of strategic importance,
abandoning containment as Kennan had envisioned and sought
to practice it, and adopting wholeheartedly the alternate
approach outlined in NSC 68.
A great deal has been written about why Truman decided
to intervene in Korea. 239 It seems clear that he saw
parallels between the attack in Korea, which was widely
believed to be sponsored if not actively controlled by the
Soviet Union, and the actions of the Axis Powers in Europe
prior to the outbreak of World War II. The Korean War
seemed to validate the assumptions behind NSC 68: if the US
succeeded in stopping the Soviets by political and economic
accomplishments in the contested areas of the periphery, the
Soviets would simply turn to naked aggression. 240 This
interpretation, taken as a general rule for future Soviet
behavior, just as clearly invalidated Kennan's approach to
containment and demonstrated the urgency of the military
buildup called for in NSC 68.
The key consideration in all this, though, is that Korea
was important for global political considerations which were
essentially unrelated to the precise location of the
Communist aggression. The blatant nature of the North Korean
attack, and the threat it represented to the system of
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collective security which the United States was developing
to check Soviet expansion counted far more than the possible
loss of the Korean peninsula. As Acheson later explained,
Korea is of very great importance to the United States and
to the United Nations because it is there that the first
great effort of collective security is being made to repel
an armed attack. ... It is motivated by the security of
the United States, because this whole question of
collective security is one of the bases of our own
security; and, therefore, when this attack occurred in
Korea and Korea appealed to the United Nations for
assistance against an unprovoked armed attack, it was of
the greatest importance that the collective-security
system should work, the United Nations should come to the
assistance of Korea, and that this attack should be
repelled, because, if that is not done, then I think the
whole system of collective security will begin to
disintegrate. 241
This was more than anything else a triumph of the
nonsi tuat ional approach, the view that US prestige and
credibility required a response, particularly to a blatant
act of aggression, regardless of the considerations of
particular military-strategic value which had led to the US
withdrawal from Korea. Since US national security had come
to be defined in terms of maintenance of peace throughout
the world, US interests, "like peace, were considered
indivisible." 242 It was, in many respects, the logical
denouement of the process which had begun with the Truman
Doctrine, the "globalization of containment in terms of
operational commitments as well as rhetoric." 243
Not all analysts agree with this interpretation. Iriye
feels that the primary US stake in Korea was in terms of the
new status quo in East Asia it was trying to establish, and
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that the US intervention was specifically aimed at
demonstrating to the countries of that region that they were
not being abandoned as many believed China had been
abandoned. 244 But it seems clear that, while the US was
concerned about Asia, it was the ultimate global
implications of a perception that the Americans were in full
retreat that was feared the most.
Matray argues that while the US may have ruled out the
desirability of using military force in Korea, it
nonetheless had made a commitment in prestige by means of
economic aid and military assistance which was sufficient to
result in a US military commitment when it became clear that
the ROK could not defend itself successfully. He sees the
US assistance program not as a limited response to a limited
interest, but rather as a test case of economic containment,
a second chance to show that the mistakes made in China were
not inevitable and that this approach, which had worked so
well with the Marshall Plan in Europe, could also work in
Asia, but without any military commitment comparable to
NATO. In his view Korea, far from being a sideshow,
occupied "a central position in Washington's overall
approach in Asia." The desire to demonstrate the viability
of this approach to containing the Soviet Union implied a
commitment to safeguard the fledgling Republic:
To permit the Communists to conquer South Korea after the
United States had expended so much in energy and resources
to prevent just such an outcome simply was not a viable
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alternative. ... In the end, American military
intervention in the Korean War constituted no reversal of
policy, but merely the fulfillment of a commitment. 245
This argument, however, does not stand up to scrutiny.
The US abandoned a far greater stake in China. Further, the
US had never pursued its Korea policy with particular zeal,
as was shown by the difficulty of getting aid approved in
Congress. Prior planning, especially by the military,
indicated a willingness to lose Korea if necessary rather
than reply with US forces. In the event, Truman reversed
this policy, but it was a reversal.
Matray more persuasively contends that the North Korean
attack was the final break between the earlier view of the
Soviet threat as being primarily limited to subversion and
infiltration, and the post-war view of it as an overt
military threat. A policy of using economic aid and
military assistance to develop viable client states no
longer seemed sufficient, since the Soviets apparently were
responding to US success with naked military aggression:
"Moscow's resort to armed force for the destruction of
"wholesome" nations appeared to justify, if not demand, an
American willingness to employ its military power to counter
the new Soviet strategy." 246 But this only reinforces the
global context of the US response. The US was not fighting
to keep Korea, but rather to avoid the appearance that it
was losing the Cold War.
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Matray also characterizes Truman's Korea strategy as a
way of atoning for the failure in China and silencing
Republican criticism, but this too seems to miss the
mark. 247 Vis a vis the Republicans, Korea was a liability,
an area to which the criticism of China policy could be
extended, never a potential asset. This was a reflection of
the fact that the Republicans, by and large, never really
cared about Korea in and of itself. A success in Korea
would not change their basic position on China, while a
failure would be used as a weapon in their continuing
struggle with Truman and the Democrats. One of the leading
critics of Truman and his China policy, Senator Robert A.
Taft (R, OH) in a speech to the Senate on 28 June 1950,
stated that "the time had to come, sooner or later, when we
would give definite notice to the Communists that a move
beyond a declared line would result in war," but he was not
sure that the US had "chosen the right time or the right
place to declare this policy," since "Korea itself is not
vitally important to the United States." 248
The military also continued to have doubts about Korea.
When asked by Senator H. Alexander Smith if there had not
been "an eleventh-hour shift of our feeling with regard to
the strategic importance of Korea?" General Omar Bradley
responded succintly: "No, sir." Even General Wedemeyer
maintained that, while "there were those who felt that Korea
was of strategic significance," he did "not happen to share
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that feeling and I do not think it is necessary to make
these sacrifices we have to hold Korea." 249
In essence, the military's concern continued to be the
commitment of scarce resources to Korea, which was still
seen as a strategic backwater. General Marshall conceded
that Korea's "close relationship to Japan, and, of course,
to Manchuria, makes it of very material importance," but
nevertheless questioned a continued US presence there: "The
question largely is to what extent we can commit forces
continuously, or under special circumstances, for the
defense of Korea." Bradley, speaking for the JCS , expressed
a simi 1 ar concern
:
We do not think that Korea is the place to fight a major
war. In other words, in case you get into a third world
war, I don't think you would choose Korea as a place to
fight it. So that we would like to have our forces
committed to Korea limited for that reason, and we would
also like to limit our commitments there so that these
other forces would be available in other parts of the
world if something else happens. 250
It is often suggested that the United States entered the
Korean War to protect its position in Japan, in essence
doing for the Japanese what they were unable to do for
themselves. But, from a purely military perspective, there
was no more concern for the US position in Japan than there
had been before the invasion of South Korea. MacArthur
still discounted the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of
Japan, pointing out that this would require an amphibious
effort which could be prevented by US control of sea and air
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around Japan. Bradley admitted that the possession of Korea
by a hostile power would be an added threat to the security
of Japan, but did not appear to consider it to be a serious
one: "you always have to stop your front line somewhere."
Wedemeyer echoed this sentiment, asking "are we going to
seize and hold all these potentially vulnerable areas around
the world?" 251 The concern for Japan was essentially the
same one which was held for all the other vulnerable points
around the Soviet periphery, that a perception that the US
was in retreat in the face of an unstoppable Soviet
onslaught would cause the Japanese to favor neutrality,
which would eventually lead to Soviet domination. 252 This
may have been accentuated by the proximity of Korea to
Japan, and indeed some felt that the US response to the
North Korean invasion would be viewed in Japan as an
indication of the likely American response in the event of
an invasion of Japan. 253 But this type of thinking had
previously been discounted: if US policy was based on
strategic importance, it was clear that the US would not
allow Japan to fall under Communist control regardless of
what it might or might not do in Korea. Only by viewing US
actions as essentially undifferentiated could the American
response to the Korean invasion be construed as a precedent
applicable to Japan.
The United States, then, intervened in Korea primarily
to demonstrate its resolve to resist further Communist
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advances, and specifically to forestall a series of
piecemeal acts of aggression. Truman believed that a
failure to respond would be tantamount to appeasement, and
that this would only lead to a larger holocaust, just as the
earlier attempts to appease Hitler had lead to World War II.
Unfortunately for the United States, the Korean War did not
end neatly with a UN victory. It did not end at all. In
fact, it took years of hard fighting and negotiating just to
arrive at an armistice. The process of obtaining that
armistice, however, led to a formalization of the US
commitment far beyond anything contemplated in the crisis
climate of June 1950.
C. FORMALIZATION OF COMMITMENT
In the process of securing Korean acquiescence to the
armistice which eventually ended the fighting, the United
States, albeit reluctantly, agreed to enter into a mutual
defense treaty with the ROK. 254 The US-ROK Mutual Defense
Treaty was signed on 1 October 1953, approved by the Senate
on 26 January 1954, and finally ratified by the President on
5 February 1954. Article III of the treaty provided that
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on either of the Parties in territories now under
their respective administrative control, or hereafter
recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under
the administrative control of the other, would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes.
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This article was carefully worded to limit the extent of the
US commitment; US policymakers were seriously concerned that
President Rhee would attack North Korea in a last ditch
attempt to reunite his country, and thereby drag the United
States into a renewed round of fighting. To meet this
concern, Article III differed from other treaties in that it
limited the territory to which the treaty applied. The
report of the Secretary of State transmitting the draft
treaty to the President further emphasized that "The
undertaking of each party to aid the other operates only in
case that party is the victim of external armed attack."
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in its report on
the treaty, explained that the phraseology limiting the
territorial extent of the treaty was in response to concern
over the possibility that the United States might be
called upon to give aid in the event the Korean Republic
should seek to extend its dominion over North Korea either
by unprovoked attack on that area or by some other means
not regarded as lawful by the United States.
The Senate felt so strongly about this that the resolution
giving its advice and consent contained a special clause
emphasizing these limitations in Article III; the treaty was
ratified with this clause appended as the "Understanding of
the United States." 255
Article III of the treaty was also limited insofar as it
contained the provision that any action would be taken in
accordance with the constitutional processes of the
respective parties, language which Secretary of State Dulles
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termed the "Monroe Doctrine" formula. The Korean treaty was
not unique in this regard, since this formula was also
contained in the Philippine and ANZUS treaties upon which
the US-ROK treaty was modeled. It did differ, however, from
the unique wording of the NATO treaty, in which an attack
upon one signatory is treated as an attack upon all. The
ROK wanted this type of commitment, and has from time to
time expressed a desire to renegotiate the treaty to change
this provision. 256
The second most significant article in the treaty was
Article IV, which formed the basis for the US military
presence in Korea: "The Republic of Korea grants, and the
United States of America accepts, the right to dispose
United States land, air and sea forces in and about the
territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual
agreement." Secretary of State Dulles pointed out, however,
that this article "does not make such disposition automatic
or mandatory." The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
noted that there was "no obligation for the United States to
maintain any armed forces whatsoever in Korea," but that
doing so would be "in our national interests for the time
being. "257
An agreement between the US and the ROK on 17 November
1954 stipulated that the United States would support the
development of "a strengthened Republic of Korea military
establishment," and that ROK forces would be retained "under
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the operational control of the United Nations Command while
that Command has responsibility for the defense of the
Republic of Korea." 258
The Appendix to this agreement on US support for the
Korean military illustrated the incredibly pervasive
influence of the United States at that time. The American
military in essence created the Korean military. The US
agreed to support a ROK force totaling 720,000 men, but
stipulated how this number would be divided among the
various services. The US recommended a revised organization
for the ROK Army. A ROK Navy of 70 ships was to be
established, but these ships were only on loan for five
years from the United States, which could reclaim them at
any time. The US agreed to provide jet fighters and
trainers, but only "in such quantities and at such times as
the Korean Air Force pilots have demonstrated the capability
to properly utilize this equipment." Finally, it was
stipulated that "The Republic of Korea military budget will
be jointly reviewed and analyzed by the Republic of Korea
and CINCUNC in order to assure that the military program
will produce the most effective forces at minimum cost." 259
Clearly, the dominant concern of the United States when
the Mutual Defense Treaty was ratified was that it would be
drawn into another Korean war, most likely as a result of a
South Korean attack on the north. Nevertheless, the United
States was undeniably committed in Korea, and there were
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American soldiers on the ground. Out of concern for the
security of these forces as much as anything else, it was
decided to strengthen the armed forces of the Republic of
Korea so that they would be able to fend for themselves.
The United States was still worried about what the Koreans
would do with an expanded military establishment, as they
had been before the Korean war, but were now somewhat
comforted by the thought that the ROK military was under the




From the moment that the United States decided to place
troops in South Korea to prevent occupation of the entire
peninsula by Soviet forces, US policy toward Korea has been
a function of US-Soviet relations. As such, it has been
effected by all the cataclysmic events and wild swings which
have characterized this relationship.
Two major themes stand out in particular. One, which
has been examined in detail in this study, is the still
unresolved conflict between the situational and non-
situational approaches to commitment. Another, corollary
themes is the conflcit between resources and commitments.
There has been a constant tension between the natural
American desire to ascribe to the nonsi tuat lona 1 approach on
the one hand and the reality of limited resources on the
other. Initially, the US resolved this conflict in Asia by
limiting commitments. Later, faced with a growing threat
from what appeared to be a monolithic Communist movement,
the US decided that it could no longer afford to place any
limits on its interests, which were viewed as an
indissoluble whole.
This shift affected the way in which the United States
selected allies. Kennan had urged selectivity in this
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process, arguing that democracy could only be spread to
those who wanted It themselves, and reserving limited US aid
for those areas in which it was the missing component in an
otherwise promising situation. Those who came after him,
notably Nitze and Dulles, took a broader view, arguing that,
in a hostile world, American security required the spread of
democracy
.
These conflicts have been evident in US relations with
many of its allies over the years. Only the areas in which
the US has clearly vital interests, such as NATO and Japan,
have proven immune from these vagaries. They enjoy a
situational commitment which does not ride on the tide of
US-Soviet relations. The US commitment to Korea, on the
other hand, is clearly nonsl tuat i onal , regardless of the
rhetoric which may periodically emanate from Washington.
The running debate between the nonsi tuat 1 ona 1 and
situational approaches to commitment formed the basis for
the formulation of US policy toward Korea between World War
II and the Korean War. Indeed, it is surprising how
consistently the same themes emerged again and again.
Decisions were made, and polices changed, but the basic
issue was never truly resolved. The debate continued even
after the US became involved in the Korean War.
The essential dilemma is that, while the US does not
really want or need Korea, it does not want its enemies to
have it either. The initial solution was the establishment
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of a trusteeship. When this failed, the US tried to bow out
gracefully, but was prevented from doing so by the blatant
nature of the North Korean invasion. Ultimately, it was the
process rather than the content of the act which proved most
si gn i f 1 cant
.
Once embroiled in the Korean War, the US could not find
a mechanism for going back to a state of lesser involvement.
This became even more difficult after the US made a formal
commitment to the ROK as part of the price for securing
Seoul's acquiesecence to the armistice ending the war. So
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